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ABSTRACT
Achieving greater renewable energy usage, energy efficiency, and energy
security are practically universal goals today. Key emerging trends to this effect
include the promotion of electric vehicles, deployment of smart grids and smart
meters, as well as technology and regulation to encourage storage and demand
response mechanisms. Overall, there is a move towards greater flexibility, with
consumers having more control over their electricity usage and costs. This
Article introduces business models to illustrate the roles of multiple actors in a
decentralized smart grid system. It identifies interactions between the various
players, the tools they will manage, the added value in using the functionalities
of such a system, and ways to maximize profits for those involved. The Article
also examines the United Kingdom (UK) as a case study. It explores where the
UK stands in terms of introducing tools and technologies for decentralization,
including electric vehicles, smart grids, and demand response mechanisms. It
also examines regulation in the UK to assess how conducive it is for
decentralized energy. In addition, the Article identifies specific concerns related
to data protection stemming from smart metering and analyses relevant
regulation in this regard.
*
Jean Monnet Chaired Professor in EU International Economic Law and Professor of Law, Queen Mary
University of London (Centre for Commercial Law Studies), United Kingdom. Visiting Researcher, Yale Law
School. Visiting Professor, Sorbonne University Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates). Member, Madrid Bar;
European University Institute, Ph.D.; European University Institute, M.Res.; Stanford Law School, J.S.M.;
Columbia Law School, LL.M.; London School of Economics and Political Science, M.Phil.; Granada University,
J.D.; Granada University, B.A. The financial help from the European Union (EU) for the writing of this Article
is gratefully acknowledged as part of the WiseGRID project (grant agreement number 731205), funded by the
EU’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program. This Article has also been written with the financial
support of the Erasmus+ Program of the EU, which funded my Jean Monnet Chair in EU International Economic
Law (project number 575061-EPP-1-2016-1-UK-EPPJMO-CHAIR). Email: r.leal-arcas@qmul.ac.uk.
**
Athens University of Economics and Business. Contact: kanakakis@aueb.gr.
***
Athens University of Economics and Business. Contact: gthanos@aueb.gr.
****
Researcher, WiseGRID project, Queen Mary University of London; Lawyer, The Government Legal
Department (Government of the United Kingdom); Solicitor qualified in Scotland; LL.M, Centre for
Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary University of London; Dip.LP, The University of Glasgow; LL.B, The
University of Glasgow. Contact: gemmakf@gmail.com. The research assistance of Juan Rios is acknowledged.

LEAL-ARCASETALPROOFS_3.25.20

436

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

5/3/2020 12:22 PM

[Vol. 34

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
In this Article, we introduce a set of archetype business models (BMs),
aiming to illustrate the roles of the multiple actors in the decentralized smart grid
and identify the composite services that may be realized from their interactions.
In this context, each business model focuses on the commercial exploitation of
a set of tools that each involved actor manages and investigates the added value
to be provided by the joint utilization of the functionalities. The objectives are
economically oriented, in the sense that they target to maximize the potential
profits for the participating actors.
The BMs are characterized as “archetype,” because they aim to account for
the entire set of services in which each tool may play a role. The archetype BMs
can be used and tailored by adopters of Smart Grid solutions (tools, applications
and services) in order to better exploit the added value from their offerings and
reinforce their market impact.
In our methodology, the archetype BMs are presented graphically using
value networks and business modeling canvas that describe the
assets/products/tools (using as an example/use case the EU WiseGRID project,1
as discussed in Section II.2) to be utilized for achieving the objectives and the
anticipated economic gains for each core participating actor. As it will become
apparent, the Smart Grid tools are designed to meet this target by achieving the
optimal utilization of the existing generation resources, suggesting the least
costly consumption schedules and contributing to the smooth integration of
innovative technologies and mechanisms (EVs, batteries, demand response
(DR)) in the smart grid. Moreover, a crucial part of our methodology is the
generation of a generic value network for Smart Grids that is used as a basis for
the analysis of the separate archetype BMs. This generic value network is
presented in Section II.1 and can be used from the energy community
stakeholders as a template for business models in the Smart Grid environment.
Such generic networks are currently missing from the existing literature.
The analysis attributes great importance in defining the gains provided by
each individual tool for each specific actor who participates in the value
network. This process firstly requires determining their ownership, i.e., which
actor bears their development and operational cost (or pays the relevant license
to a third party) and receives the revenues from their management. In most of
1
WiseGRID is a research project (number 731205) funded by the EU’s Horizon 2020 research and
innovation program. Professor Dr. Rafael Leal-Arcas is one of the Principal Investigators. See generally
WISEGRID, www.wisegrid.eu (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).
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the cases, each involved actor manages a single tool. This approach is followed
in order to demonstrate the highest possible granularity of the value networks
and investigate if such conditions allow for lucrative business models to appear.
We mention beforehand that this approach may be extended to capture hybrid
cases, when one actor undertakes multiple roles and consequently bears the cost
and gains the profits related to the management of more than one tool.
Focus is given to the commercial exploitation tools whose sophistication
provides the optimal local consumption and production schedules at the
prosumers’ premises. According to the basic business model, these tools are
managed by an energy service company (ESCO), which elaborates the necessary
data and provides the optimal suggestions to the prosumers. The ESCO receives
as payment a portion of the prosumer’s savings due to the decreased electricity
bill or a part of their compensation (provided by other actors, e.g. the virtual
power plant (VPP) Operator) for their participation in the considered services
(e.g. an explicit DR event). This form of revenues is aligned with the report of
the European Commission,2 which suggests the Energy Performance Contacting
(EPC) as the financial model between the ESCOs and the prosumers.
Essentially, the EPC model implies that “remuneration of the ESCO is directly
tied to the energy savings achieved,” and thus transfers the risk of the investment
to the ESCO and encourages the market competitions between such companies.
In the following sections, we describe the potential risks that may arise from
these forms of revenue, which make the engagement of the ESCO questionable
and propose further candidate revenue schemes aiming to prevent a possible
market failure. A similar rationale is also followed for the actor(s) who should
bear the capex cost of the innovative technology (such as the charging stations)
because this factor may be beneficial for multiple participants in the value
network.
For all the BMs, our analysis provides preliminary insight into the state of
the grid in the absence of these tools and the innovative technology, and
consequently the actors’ increased costs or the limited revenue due to the lack
of their sophistication and the advances capabilities that they respectively
provide. This process is a prerequisite for identifying the “business as usual
case,” which is commonly considered the comparison benchmark for identifying
the source of the added value and quantify the potential benefits for the actors.
Finally, the following Sections document the technical, regulatory, and
behavioral barriers that may prevent the realization of such BMs and question
2
The European Commission’s Science and Knowledge Service, EUR. COMM’N: EU SCI HUB, https://ec.
europa.eu/jrc/en/energy-efficiency/eed-support/energy-service-companies (last updated Nov. 14, 2016).
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the lucrative exploitation of the involved tools in the market and sketch the
roadmap for the mitigation of this risk.
Finally, it is mentioned that the complex environment of the smart grid with
multiple interacting actors, allows to potentially design additional and more
complicated scenarios than those described. Some of these possible alternatives
are documented in the following sections, along with the basic scenario that is
considered. We emphasize that our novel methodology is suitable for capturing
such extensions and the value network graphs may be appropriately modified to
depict the flows of money and information that correspond to each case.
After this Introduction, this Article provides in Section II an analysis of
decentralized energy by examining the various archetype business models and
barriers. Section III then analyzes the example of the United Kingdom as a case
study. Section IV concludes.
I.

DECENTRALIZED ENERGY: ARCHETYPE BUSINESS MODELS AND BARRIERS

A. A Generic Value Network for Smart Grids
Figure 1 presents a generic value network for Smart Grids. It depicts ten key
business roles and their interactions in terms of power, information, and money
flows. This generic value network does not aim to represent all the business roles
and all the possible interactions between the various stakeholders, as this is not
possible due to the composite and rapidly evolving nature of the Smart Grids.
However, it represents a vast number of scenarios and the most important
players. Its purpose is to serve as a guideline/template for creating and analyzing
various business cases and scenarios toward a decentralized Smart Grid.
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Figure 1: The Archetype Value Network for Smart Grids

In its current form, the generic value network includes the following “core”
business roles:
1. Power Production that is responsible for the power generation, using
either fossil fuels or Renewable Energy Sources (RES). This role may
include multiple actors independently of their size, i.e. from large power
plants to small residential prosumers.
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2. The Power Transmission grid is operated by the Transmission System
Operator (TSO)s and provides High-Voltage transmission from the
generation units and interconnection services between the distribution
grids. The TSO is responsible for the maintenance of the transmission
system and must also take the necessary actions (capacity development)
to guarantee its ability to satisfy the evolving demand.
3. The Power Distribution grid is operated by the Distribution System
Operators (DSO). It is connected with the transmission grid and
provides Low (or Medium) Voltage power to end users. The DSO is
responsible for operating the transmission system and planning the
necessary capacity expansion adequate enough to satisfy the future
demand. His role is also crucial for the incorporation of distributed
generators in the smart grid.
4. The Wholesale Market Operation combines the information of the
production cost and demand forecasting to compute the wholesale
prices and propagate them to the generators, the retailers, and the
aggregators.
5. The Power Retailers perform the final sale of power to end users.
These agents try to forecast in accuracy the future demand and reserve
the adequate amount in the wholesale market, which they resell to their
customers.
6. The Balance Services, provided by the Balancing Responsible Party,
who operates as an intermediator between the Wholesale Market and
the Retailers. This agent is responsible to guarantee that the quantity
reserved by the retailers is actually consumed.
7. The Aggregators offer intermediate services between the end users and
the other participants in the Smart Grid. They are responsible for
designing and providing the sophistication for the orchestration of
multiple appliances, such that their collective consumption scheduling
results in benefits to their owners and a remarkable positive effect for
the grid. The appliances may belong to multiple individual users with
personal interests or to a single entity (for instance a fleet of EVs).
8. The Energy Efficiency and Management Services role may be
undertaken by the relevant companies or organizations, such as the EV
Fleet manager, the Battery Operator, the ESCBOs, and Renewable
Energy Service Companies (RESCOs). These agents operate as
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intermediators between the aggregator and the end-users and offer the
necessary equipment (e.g., Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE),
smart meter, Building Management Systems (BMS) and automated
operations (e.g. Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)), which allow a
consumption schedule to be realized (e.g. Automated DR event).
9. Power Consumption refers to all electrical appliances that consume
power for their real time operation. As it becomes apparent below, we
choose to distinguish between power consumption and energy storage,
because the latter term refers to appliances (batteries), which consume
power for supplying energy for other devices or inserting it to the grid.
10. The Energy Storage refers to the means which capture/store the
produced electricity for some future use. We choose to assign a separate
role for energy storage even though it could be also represented as a
combination of consumption and production. This is because batteries
do not literally produce new power but may inject the previously
consumed power in the grid, aiming to smooth out the negative impact
of peak loads.
The actors may undertake a single business role or a combination of multiple
such activities in the market. For instance, an end-user is a consumer when
relying on the grid for the operation of its appliances and becomes a provider
when offering electricity to the grid for the harmonization of the demand. In this
latter case, this agent is considered as a prosumer, a term that may refer to
multiple business scenarios. More specifically:





A prosumer may be a consumer who does not produce new power but
participates in a Demand Response (DR) event and accepts to curtail
her demand during peak hours.
A prosumer may also generate power from a small-scale PV
infrastructure (residential) and inject it (feed in) in the grid.
A prosumer may own storage means (e.g. EV Company or residential
end-user with batteries) and utilize them either for self-consumption or
for supplying devices of another agent.
Any combination of the above cases.

Additionally, more actors may arise by the combination of the basic roles. For
example, a retailer may decide to build its own generation plant, aiming to
reduce its dependency from the fluctuating prices in the wholesale market and
the consequent risks. In this scenario the resulting role is referred as a pretailer.
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Additionally, a retailer may decide to undertake aggregation services, aiming to
take advantage of the existing customer basis.
Figure 1 does not include a role for the regulator, because this agent does not
offer a distinct contribution to the composition of a service, but is instead
responsible for the supervision of the whole system—to guarantee the “level
playing field,” i.e. that all actors are imposed the same set of rules and have
access to equal volume of information. The impact of this role may be implicitly
included in a Business Model Canvas, by means of the entrance barriers due to
the regulatory framework in the considered market. In the analysis of the
archetype business models in the next section, we use this business modeling
canvas approach to illustrate the main components of the business models.
B. The EU Paradigm—EU Project WiseGRID
In order to apply our methodology for business modeling analysis and
generate a number of archetype business models for decentralized energy and
Smart Grids, we exploited as a paradigm the EU research and innovation project
WiseGRID.3 WiseGRID, running from November 1, 2016, to April 30, 2020, is
one of the largest, in terms of funding—with a total cost more than 17 million
Euros—projects co-funded by the European Commission’s Horizon 2020 work
program.4 The WiseGRID project provides a set of solutions, technologies, and
business models, which increase the smartness, stability, and security of an open,
consumer-centric European energy grid. It also provides cleaner and more
affordable energy for European citizens through an enhanced use of storage
technologies, electro-mobility, and a highly increased share of Renewable
Energy Resources. It aims to deliver the tools and business models that will
facilitate the creation of an open market and enable all energy stakeholders to
play an active role toward a democratic energy transition.
By communicating with the partners participating in the project and with key
energy stakeholders in the EU region as part of the project’s dissemination
activities, we were able to extract the necessary information to create a number
of archetype business models using the methodology described in the previous
sub-sections, a subset of which we are presenting in this Article. Furthermore,
as part of project activities these models are currently under implementation (as
part of project’s pilots) and evaluation.

3

See generally WISEGRID, supra note 1.
See generally EUR. COMM’N: HORIZON 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en (last
visited Feb. 11, 2020).
4
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A key element in the business models are the Smart Grid products and
services that create value for all the involved players. The example products that
we will refer to in the next Section, developed in WiseGRID are the following,
as depicted in Figure 2:


WG Cockpit is the WiseGRID technological solution targeting DSOs
and micro grid operators, allowing them to control, manage, and
monitor their own grid, improving flexibility, stability, and security of
their network. The main purpose of the WG Cockpit is to enable grid
operators to manage the fundamental changes that distribution grids are
facing nowadays, some remarkable ones of those being the transition
toward a grid with high penetration of distributed renewable energy
resources and the presence of additional significant loads coming from
EVs among others.



Energy STorage as a Service/Virtual Power Plants (STaaS/VPP) is
the WiseGRID technological solution targeting VPP Operators who act
as load aggregators. This tool will make operational a service by which
consumers/prosumers can easily offer to the market their unused
storage capacity. Additionally, a complementary embedded service
allows consumers/prosumers to easily aggregate their spare energy
generation and offer it to the market in the form of a VPP.



WiseEVP is the WiseGRID technological solution addressed to
electromobility actors to optimize the activities related with smart
charging and discharging of the EVs including V2G (Vehicle-to Grid)
and V2B (Vehicle-to Building), striving to utilize their inherent
flexibility and storage capabilities.



FAST Vehicle to the Grid (V2G) is the fast EV charging station,
which will enable the use of EV as dynamic distributed storage devices,
feeding electricity stored in their batteries back into the system when
needed (fast V2G supply). This can help reduce electricity system costs
by providing a cost-effective means of providing regulation services
and peak-shaving capacity.



WiseCOOP is the WiseGRID technological solution mainly targeted
toward energy retailers for achieving a balanced portfolio. The tool
supports retailers by managing demand response campaigns,
elaborating the energy consuming loads of their existing customers, and
computing the dynamic price to be applied in the case of a DR event.
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WiseCORP is a technological solution targeting businesses, industries,
ESCOs, and public facilities (consumers and prosumers) with the
objective of providing them the necessary mechanisms to become
smarter energy players. By means of energy usage monitoring and
analysis, proper information can be given to facility managers helping
them to reduce energy costs and environmental impact.



WiseHOME Application informs home residents of their energy
consumption to raise their awareness regarding the impact of their
consumption on several aspects, such as cost, emissions, and intracooperative collaboration, and it stimulates their active participation in
DR campaigns.

These tools belong in certain market segments serving as examples for purposes
of our analysis. They can easily be substituted in terms of functionalities found
in the market today.
Figure 2: WiseGRID Tools for Smart Grids and Relevant Market Segments

C. Analysis of Archetype Business Models for a Decentralized Smart Grid
This Section presents a selection of archetype business models that
correspond to the different areas to be addressed in Section II. They are
presented and analyzed using the methodology discussed in Section I, i.e., a
value network analysis and business modeling canvas.
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1. Electric Vehicles: Exploiting the Integration of EVs in the Grid
This Section analyzes the business cases originating from the electrification
of the transportation sector, i.e., the integration of the EVs and their charging
infrastructure in the smart grid. The business cases consider an Electric Vehicles
Supply Equipment Operator (EVSE), managing a charging station and an EV
fleet manager who owns many EVs and aims to charge them economically,
meaning that the latter actor undertakes the role of the prosumer. The EV fleet
manager also owns and operates an EV management platform like the
WiseGRID WiseEVP tool, which we will use as an example here that considers
the charging constraints of each individual EV—such as the required charging
level at a specific time instant—and computes their collective flexibility
capabilities.
The EV fleet manager, may use the consumption flexibility to provide DR
services to the DSO. The DSO may request such services aiming to control the
power flow at the specific regulation area where the EVSE is located. Multiple
reasons may trigger such an event including the avoidance of RES production
curtailment (DR for consumption increase) or the smooth-out of the grid
congestion (DR for consumption decrease). More specifically, the DR requests
may refer only to the G2V process where the consumed energy is used to cover
the needs of the EVs. For instance, part of the DSO’s grid may be congested and
consequently the DSO will initiate a DR request, aiming to maintain the RES
production within a specific area closely to the RES. Otherwise, the DSO should
prevent the RES from injecting power in its grid and consequently should pay
the relevant compensation to the generators for the curtailment. Alternatively,
we may consider the case when the distributed RES connected with the grid of
the DSO produces more than the demand and thus the DSO must pay to the TSO
the regulated transmission tariffs.
Aiming to avoid the potential costs, the DSO initiates a DR request to
increase the local consumption within the regulation area. The DSO requires the
consumption of a specific volume of energy during a specific time period and
provides an amount for each consumed unit. It is reasonable to consider that the
total amount of money offered must be less than the potential costs of the DSO.
Additional services are possible, including also the V2G process. For instance,
the DSO may require a bidirectional DR event, i.e., both the consumption of a
volume of energy but also its injection back to the grid at some specific future
period (the alternative fuels directive encourages the EU Member States to
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develop systems which enable EVs to feed power back into the grid).5 Apart
from the DR services, the DSO may request the provision of ancillary services,
which may be supported by the EVs’ batteries, such as the voltage regulation
and frequency control.
In order to offer services that increase their revenues or decrease their costs,
the EVSE provider and the prosumers (in our case the EV fleet manager) may
participate in the value network as members of a Virtual Power Plant. The VPP
operator bids aggregated bundles of services from EVSE provides (potentially
along with services from other providers) in the relevant balancing and ancillary
service markets and offers them part of his revenues (paid by the DSO) for their
contribution in realizing the requested services. Then, the EVSE may propagate
to the EV fleet manager lower charging prices during the DR event period and
the EV fleet manager may reschedule the charging pattern of the EVs (by means
of the electric vehicle management platform), attempting to reduce his
operational costs. Alternatively, the business model may consider bilateral
agreements between the DSO and the EVSE Operator, skipping the intermediary
role of the VPP Operator. This is feasible because the DSO has knowledge about
the location of the EVSE infrastructure and may directly request a service from
the suitable actor who is located at the regulated area of interest. For reasons of
simplicity, we consider the latter scenario below. All the extra functionalities
that the EVSEs provide to the smart grid, respect the preferences of the EV user,
meaning his constraints (e.g. charge required to be completed within a certain
time frame) will be prioritized in the charging sessions scheduling process.
Concerning the actor who bears the purchase, installation, and maintenance
cost of the EVSE infrastructure, the BM assumes a liberalized competitive
market and consequently considers that the EVSE Operator undertakes this
investment. For completeness reasons we mention that according to the strategy
in some Member States, the DSO may lead this investment to stimulate the
penetration of EVs in the market, while its incurred cost is included in the policy
of the regulated assets. Once the market develops, the DSO may sell this
infrastructure to market parties (e.g. via auctions) to cover the remaining cost
and open the way to competition.
An extended scenario could also consider owners of a single EV who charge
them at a public charging station (operated by the EVSE provider) and aim to
achieve benefits by participating in the aforementioned services. In this case, the
contractual agreement between the EV Fleet manager (who provides the

5

Council Directive 2014/94, 2014 O.J. (L 307) 1, 5 (EU).
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sophistication of the WiseEVP tool) and the owner of the EV must be mutually
beneficial. For instance, if the vehicle is planned to be charged during a DR event
(requiring increase of consumption, as described above), then the EV fleet
manager should receive a payment by its owner for advising this less costly
schedule, while the latter actor is still favored by the lower prices. In the case
that the EV participates in the provision of ancillary service (e.g., the frequency
control), the EV fleet manager should keep a portion of the compensation that
corresponds to this specific EV, according to its contribution.
The added value of an EV at the unitary level, e.g., a domestic prosumer
owning a single EV who charges it with his private EVSE, may be incorporated
in issues of storage, which investigate the relevant benefits from the batteries’
integration and storage in the grid. Indeed, the EV may be considered as a battery
with intermittent availability, a parameter that may be formulated as a constraint
in the relevant local-level optimization objectives.
Finally, we mention that the sophistication of an Electric Vehicle
management tool like the example WiseEVP may be also utilized when the
retailer or the DSO propagates dynamic prices to the EVSE Operator. An
illustrative example is Spain, where a new discriminatory tariff has been
proposed for promoting the charging of EVs at times of lower demand and lower
prices.6 In this context, the functionalities of the tool should define the least
costly charging schedule subject to the above constraints.
EV usage has continued growing over the past years, according to Electric
Vehicle Initiative (EVI) Global EV Outlook 2017.7 The EU takes the lead in
relative numbers of EV per capita, whereas The People’s Republic of China has
the greatest absolute stock of electric vehicles. The report states that the electric
car stock will range—with good chance—“between 9 million and 20 million by
2020 and between 40 million and 70 million by 2025.”8 These numbers are on
par with the targets of the Paris Agreement on climate change. Nevertheless,
there are still regulatory and financial obstacles that hinder the higher
penetration of EVs compared to their conventional counterparts. For instance, in
Norway and the Netherlands, where EV sales are very high, regulatory
incentives have played a large role in promoting consumer interest.9 These
6
COUNCIL OF EUR. ENERGY REGULATORS (CEER), CEER STATUS REVIEW ON EUROPEAN REGULATORY
APPROACHES ENABLING SMART GRIDS SOLUTIONS, C13-EQS-57-04, at 14, (2014) [hereinafter CEER 2014
STATUS REVIEW].
7
Int’l Energy Agency, Global EV Outlook 2017: Two Million and Counting, OECD/IEA 2017.
8
Id. at 6.
9
Paul Hockenos, With Norway in Lead, Europe Set for Surge in Electric Vehicles, YALE ENV’T 360
(Feb. 6, 2017), http://e360.yale.edu/features/with-norway-in-the-lead-europe-set-for-breakout-on-electric-vehicles);
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incentives include tax exemptions on EV purchases, one-off grants, and the
imposition of taxes on fossil fuels. In Belgium, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, and
the Netherlands, for instance, there is a full registration tax exemption on EV
Purchases, while Denmark and Finland provide a partial exemption.10 Other
financial schemes employed by governments are fixed grants, as employed in
France and Portugal for the replacing of an end-of-life vehicle with a new
electric vehicle.
Another barrier is the development and installation of the necessary
infrastructure (particularly of the charging points) because the new fast charging
technology is not only expensive to install, but also requires high voltage input
and therefore the associated consumption fee is high. Governments have also
taken various actions towards this direction.11 For instance, France has set up a
special fund for the construction of charging infrastructure, which led to the
construction of 5,000 charging points in 2015, while in Sweden those individuals
who installed charging points in their homes obtained a tax reduction for the
associated labor cost.
Table 1 below shows a generic business model for integrating EVs in the
network, and Figure 3 below shows the generic value network for integrating
EVs in the network.
Table 1: Generic Business Model for Integrating EVs in the Network in
Canvas Form
Actors Involved
 Prosumer: EV Fleet Manager
 EVSE Operator
 DSO
Roles Involved

Value Proposition



Power consumption (role performed by
EV Fleet manager by means of the EVs
that manages).
 EE & EM Services (role performed by
EVSE Operator providing the EVSE).
 Power distribution (role performed by
DSO through WG Cockpit).
EV Fleet Manager
 His charging preferences will be met.
 Will provide flexibility to the system

THE INT’L COUNCIL ON CLEAN TRANSP. (ICCT), EUR. VEHICLE MARKET STATISTICS (2015–2016).
10
EUR. ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (EEA), ELECTRIC VEHICLES IN EUROPE, No. 20/2016, at 60 (2016).
11
Id. at 14.
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only when he wants to.
 Will reduce his operational cost by
utilizing the inherent flexibility
capabilities and the storage equipment of
the EVs.

Revenue Streams

EVSE Operator
 Will be able to offer more competitive
prices to its customers (EV fleet
manager).
 Will be able to cover the investment on
EVSE infrastructure sooner.
DSO
 Will have additional tools (participation
in the flexibility market) to operate the
distribution network.
 Will improve his quality of supply
indexes.
EV Fleet Manager
 Will decrease its charging cost by
utilizing the EVs’ flexibility and shifting
their consumption during the DR events.
 Will receive revenues from the
participation in V2G services, allowing
(e.g.) the injection of energy from the
EVs’ batteries in the grid.
EVSE Operator
 Will increase its clientele and thus have
increased revenues for using the EVSE.
 May receive a portion of the
compensation provided by the DSO for
the provision of ancillary service.
DSO
 If quality of supply indexes improves, the
DSO will avoid punishments and
investment costs for the grid maintenance
and capacity expansion.
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EV Fleet Operator
 Economic investment in software (like
WiseEVP) and communication channels
and technologies with the other
participation tools.
EVSE Operator
 Economic investment in the EVSE
infrastructure.
DSO
 Economic investment for the
development and operation of the
software (WG Cockpit tool) and
communication channels and
technologies with the WiseEVP (via the
IOP), to send service requests.
EV Fleet Manager
 Limited idle time of the EVs during the
day to allow dynamic charging or V2G,
because the batteries of the vehicles take
long to be fully charged.
 Idle time of the vehicles is mostly at
night, thus not many opportunities appear
to answer grid requests.
 Rapid aging of batteries if too many
recharge cycles are applied, leading to
faster replacement costs.
EVSE Operator
 The high investment cost of EVSE may
cause less than the necessary
infrastructure in the market and may lead
to suboptimal utilization of the inherent
storage capacity.
 The charging infrastructure requires high
voltage input, and therefore, it is
associated with high consumption fees.
DSO
 The high purchase price of EVs and their
limited autonomy, causes their low
penetration in the market.
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Figure 3: Generic Value Network for Integrating EVs in the Network

2. Demand Response: Supply-Demand Balancing by Means of Implicit DR
Events
The following identified archetype BM investigates the added value
provided by an energy aware Demand Response tool (such as the WiseCOOP
tool) to the retailer, for meeting its obligation of a balanced portfolio by means
of implicit DR events. Recall that the implicit DR refers to the propagation of
dynamic prices by the retailer to its clients to incentivize them to reform their
consumption pattern. Thus, the BM investigates the added value provided by the
tools that manage the consumption and production of the prosumers at the local
level, in terms of mitigating the risk of high electricity bills due to their exposure
in dynamic pricing schemes.
According to the basic investigated scenario, the retailer handles the
balancing responsibility on its own, meaning that it also undertakes the role of
the Balancing Responsible Party (BRP). Focusing on the functionalities of the
WiseCOOP tool (to be mentioned below), we consider that the retailer/BRP does
not manage generation units and consequently does not have the option of
production rescheduling. Thus, a balanced position consists of the equalization
of its clients’ consumption with the volume of energy purchased (reserved) in
the wholesale market. In what follows, we consider the case of when the
retailer’s forecast about the demand of its clients, and consequently, the volume
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of energy purchased in the day ahead of wholesale market, does not match the
actual consumption. In the case of a negative imbalance, i.e., when the reserved
energy is not adequate to cover the actual demand, the retailer/BRP may
purchase further energy in the intra-day market, but such a choice may be
particularly costly. In the opposite case, the retailer/BRP must pay an imbalance
penalty to the TSO for its inaccurate estimation12
The scenario assumes that the retailers’ customers have already signed
contracts that expose them to dynamic pricing schemes. In what follows, we
describe the potential benefits from accepting such an exposure. The retailer’s
tool may gather all the necessary data from each individual prosumer—by means
of the communication between the relevant tools—that let this agent know how
they adapt their consumption with respect to the prices, environmental
conditions, and social events. The retailer uses this knowledge to compute a
response with these parameters in mind. Utilizing this information and the
energy management tool, the retailer is aware of the appropriate level of the
prices, which should cause the desired collective modification in the demand
profile of its clients (load shifting/shedding) and will result in a balanced energy
portfolio. The calculation may either refer to personalized prices for each
individual client or to common prices for all the members of its clientele.
The dynamic prices are propagated both to residential prosumers and tertiary
buildings via the energy management tools. With regard to their operation, the
basic business scenario considers that it is performed by an ESCO, which
receives revenue streams as a portion of the prosumer’s bill savings. The BM
considers prosumers who have installed batteries and may store energy from the
grid during periods of low prices and consume it when the electricity is more
expensive. Additionally, the prosumers have installed RES and may compare
their revenues from the injection of their production in the grid, with the savings
from a reduced electricity bill if they choose to self-consume/store. In this
context, the main business role of the ESCO is to provide, by means of the tools
it manages, the optimal scheduling of the assets at the local level such that the
revenues of the prosumers are maximized (or their billing cost is minimized),
always taking into consideration their price sensitivity and their convenience
constraints or preference. Thus, the tools must present the optimal schedules of
the assets in a user-friendly way, which will allow the prosumers to easily adopt
the proposed schedules and understand their potential revenues. Apart from the
economic incentives, the response of the domestic prosumers to dynamic prices
may be stimulated by social and ethical parameters, such as the feeling of
12

KU LEUVEN ENERGY INST., THE CURRENT ELECTRICITY MARKET DESIGN IN EUROPE 3 (2015).
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working together toward a common purpose and the impact of comparisons and
competition with other peers of the communities (e.g., neighbors). Such
functionalities should also be provided by the tools managed by the ESCO to
stimulate the efficient response of the occupants to the dynamic prices because
its revenues strongly depend on their consumption rescheduling (being a portion
of the electricity bill savings).
From the perspective of the retailer/BRP, this BM exploits the added value
offered by tools for DR planning like the WiseCOOP tool stemming from better
demand-side management, in terms of reducing or eliminating the cost that is
related with an imbalanced portfolio. From the prosumer’s perspective, it
exploits the added value provided from energy management tools at the
consumer (e.g. home) level. The added value may be quantified by comparing
prosumers who follow the optimal schedules provided by the tools’
functionality, with those who maintain their flat-fee consumption pattern despite
the propagation of dynamic prices by the retailer. Additionally, it may be
quantified by estimating the gains for those prosumers who accept the retailers’
favorable contracts. For instance, a candidate contract between the retailer and
a prosumer may combine a dynamic pricing scheme in the form of critical peak
pricing during the peak periods, and flat rates for the rest of the time. Then, the
prosumer may accept such a contract if the level of the flat prices is lower than
those in a contract that does not include any dynamic scheme. The optimal
consumption-suggestions of the tools should guarantee that such a choice will
result in lower electricity bills for the prosumer.
We clarify that this type of DR event is characterized as implicit, because
the retailer does not require a specific volume of consumption curtailment but
provides economic incentives for consumption shifting/shedding via dynamic
pricing, while the prosumers voluntarily respond to such signals. However, this
voluntary nature of implicit DR makes the intervention of an ESCO questionable
and is one of the main barriers for the development of such business models.
Indeed, the prosumers may not always appropriately shift their consumption
according to ESCO’s suggestions. As a direct result the anticipated savings in
the retailer’s bill will not (or partially) be realized and the ESCO will lose its
source of revenues. To overcome this risk, the business model proposes
alternative forms of revenue streams for the ESCO. For instance, it could require
a flat fee from the prosumers for providing its optimal suggestions, along with
the portion of their bill savings. Additionally, the ESCO should strategically
choose the suitable subset of prosumers to offer its services, based on an analysis
of their price sensitivity, which reflects its potential revenues. Nevertheless, the
revenues of the ESCO may not justify its business role, especially for domestic
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prosumers whose payback from their participation in the implicit DR events are
not expected to be noteworthy. To this end, the business model suggests
alternative options for the commercial exploitation of tools that schedule the
local assets, such as the WiseHOME and the WiseCORP. For example, in the
context of the current scenario, the retailer may provide these tools free-ofcharge (or at the price that equals their development cost) to its clients to help
them participate more efficiently in the implicit DR events, while protecting
them from their exposure to the dynamic pricing schemes. In this case, the
retailer objective is not to achieve direct revenues from selling the tools, but
rather to utilize them for meeting a balanced portfolio, while keeping its clientele
satisfied by the offered service and preventing them from switching to any of its
competitors. We emphasize that such services are of importance in a liberalized
market because the consumers have the right to change their supplier without
any extra charges.
Concerning the regulatory barriers, the CEER’s study revealed that seventyone percent of the sampled European countries used only static time of use
tariffs, a pricing scheme which clearly does not provide the field for the implicit
demand side response to be realized.13 Despite this fact, Time of Use pricing
schemes appear in countries like Greece, where there are differential tariffs for
peak and off-peak consumption for residential consumers.14 However, not all
European States apply “price signals” to induce customers to change their
consumption patterns.
From a technical perspective, demand response programs should be made as
easy as possible for consumers to participate. In addition to concentrating on the
rewards side of the equation, attention should be devoted also to the cost side;
consumers will have to invest as little time and effort as possible, so that they
might engage in demand response even if the financial rewards are not very high
in absolute terms. In this context, automatization of responses appears to be
crucial: consumers will not have to do anything because adjustments in their
consumption patterns will be automatic.
Finally, it is now well-known, in part, due to studies from the discipline of
economics, that the efforts of policymakers to empower consumers are often
frustrated by the fact that consumers do not react to efforts to alter their
consumption patterns. Ironically, this is because they do not see the financial
gain as sufficient to reward altering their consumption. In light of this difficulty,
13

See CEER 2014 Status Review, supra note 6.
See generally Residential Night Tariff, PPC, https://www.dei.gr/en/oikiakoi-pelates/timologia/oikiakotimologio-me-xronoxrewsi-oikiako-nuxterino (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).
14
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the involved tools must provide additional information apart from the economic
savings to be achieved, such as the environmental benefits from the reduction of
the CO2 emissions when shifting the consumption during period of high RES
generation. Such types of incentives have been observed to stimulate the user’s
participation in DR events and are considered a major drive for their active
engagement.15
Table 2 provides a generic business model for demand response in canvas
form, and Figure 4 depicts a generic value network for demand response.
Table 2: Generic Business Model for Demand Response in Canvas Form
Actors Involved
 Prosumer
 Retailer
 ESCO/(EE&EM)
Roles Involved
 Power Consumption & Production, Energy
Storage (role performed by domestic and
tertiary prosumers).
 EE and EM Services (role performed by the
ESCO, which manages the functionalities of
the WiseHOME and WiseCORP tools).
 Power Retailing (role performed by the
retailer).
Value
Prosumer
Proposition for
 A prosumer who participates in the implicit
Involved Actors
DR events may negotiate favorable contracts
with the retailer (as described above).
 Prosumers who have installed RES and
generate electricity can utilize self-balancing
to generate added value through the
difference in the prices of buying, generating,
and selling electricity.
 Prosumers who have installed batteries in
their households/premises may adapt their
electricity consumption profiles according to
the dynamic prices with a lower
inconvenience cost and utilize to higher
extent renewable energy sources.
 Will be able to follow more accurately the
optimal schedules by means of their
visualization, while they remain within their

15

SMART ENERGY DEMAND COALITION, MAPPING DEMAND RESPONSE IN EUROPE TODAY 27 (2015).
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comfort zone.
Retailer
 Implicit DR enables retailers to adjust their
portfolio demand profile so that it better
matches the profile of energy purchased from
the wholesale energy markets, therefore
reducing chances of imbalance (the value
proposition considered in this BM).
 Retailers can employ dynamic pricing tariffs,
such as time of use, critical-peak pricing, and
real-time pricing to better represent market
prices, expose consumers to the real
electricity cost, and raise their awareness (out
of scope).
 Retailers can use load flexibility, through
dynamic prices, to reduce peak demand, and
benefit from stability in the network.
ESCO
 Energy Service Companies can benefit from
the dynamic supply/demand interplay by
offering suitable services to prosumers and
retailers, such as forecasting information and
prediction models, remote maintenance and
support, and onsite or offsite energy
management.
 Energy cost management or tariff
comparison, can be offered by ESCOs to
facility managers and/or residential
consumers, opening up new lines of business.
Prosumer
 Reduced electricity bill by means of load
shifting/shedding and the use of batteries.
 Better utilization of RES by comparing the
consumption prices (retailer) with the
potential revenues from grid injection to
make the optimal decision: either selfconsume or sell.
Retailer
 Reduced cost or penalties due to its portfolio
imbalance (main source).
 Dynamic tariff schemes and related enhanced
information services can increase the supplier
market share via consumer engagement and
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improved brand image.
ESCO


Cost Streams

Barriers

Revenues for providing the sophistication of
the energy management tool’s functionalities.
Their revenues are a portion of the electricity
bill reduction combined if necessary, with a
flat fee.

Prosumer
 Part of their savings are given to the ESCO
for providing the optimal consumption and
RES generation schedules.
Retailer
 Economic investment for the development
and operation of the software for the DR
planning tool, communication channels, and
technologies with the energy management
tools.
ESCO
 Economic investment for the development
and operation of the software for the energy
management tools and communication
channels and technologies with the DR
planning tool.
 Potential charges paid to prosumers and/or
aggregators for not providing suitable
services and/or accurate information.
Prosumer
 The insufficient economic benefits from their
participation on implicit DR programs.
 The lack of information about the further
benefits achieved by the DR programs, such
as the environmental ones, that would
strongly stimulate the active participation of
the environmental-sensitive individuals.
 The lack of automation equipment that would
make their engagement in DR programs more
convenient.
Retailer
 The absence of dynamic pricing schemes in
the member states, and the lack of incentives
for the prosumers that reduce the portion of
the retailer’s clientele that would opt into
such programs.
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The prosumers’ reactions to the dynamic
prices and the adoption of the ESCO’s
suggestions are on a volunteer basis, and thus
the revenues of this actor (as a portion of the
electricity bill savings) become questionable.

Figure 4: Generic Value Network for Demand Response

3. Storage: Prosumers-Driven Energy Storage Integration
This Section analyzes business cases and potential business models driven
by the integration of energy storage systems at the prosumers’ premises, in either
domestic or tertiary buildings and focusing on the added value of services that
may arise from their utilization. Our analysis clusters the services according to
the level of their implementation, a parameter which also determines the
involved actors. On the local level, the batteries are used to optimize the
revenues of a single prosumer, while on the aggregation level the VPP Operator
(aggregator) pools the storage capabilities of multiple individual prosumers,
targeting to offer more demanding (in terms of storage capacity) services to
further actors of the smart grid, such as the DSO.
More specifically, on the prosumer level the integration of batteries can
result in consumption patterns which are less dependent on variable energy

LEAL-ARCASETALPROOFS_3.25.20

2020]

FINANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY

5/3/2020 12:22 PM

459

prices. For instance, the prosumer may be exposed to dynamic prices propagated
by the retailer (either time-of-use or real-time schemes). Then, the storage unit
operation may be scheduled according to the prices’ fluctuations; charged when
energy prices are low and discharged when energy prices are high. As a result,
the prosumer may achieve a reduced retailer’s bill, while limiting the impact of
consumption shifting on his convenience preference. An extended scenario (still
on local level), may consider a prosumer who has also installed RES on his
rooftop. In this situation, the prosumer may decide the most profitable strategy,
in terms or revenues maximization: (1) either store the self-production to meet
his own future needs; or (2) inject it in the grid and receive the relevant payment.
The monitoring and configuration of storage units at the prosumer level will be
mainly supported by the ESCO which owns and operates tools for energy
management (like the WiseHOME and WiseCORP tools), for residential and
tertiary buildings. According to the basic business model, these companies
receive a portion of the prosumers’ savings or profits, as a revenue for the
provided services.
The individual prosumers may achieve additional benefits from installed
storage systems, by their collective participation in a Virtual Power Plant (VPP).
The VPP Operator bids in the ancillary and balancing markets for services
requested by the DSO, which contribute to the smooth operation of the grid.
Such services may be frequency-control, reactive power and voltage control,
back-up service, and peak shaving for grid congestion management. The VPP
Operator aims to expand its portfolio with prosumers owning batteries, because
such members may participate more actively in DR events and more importantly
are necessary for provisioning a subset of the aforementioned services. To this
end, the VPP Operator must invest in the communication, metering and control
infrastructure needed for the data collection from the batteries and use such data
as input for developing sophisticated algorithms for their scheduling in the
market participation. Furthermore, the VPP Operator collects data by means of
energy management tools from the markets related to the requests for services
provisioning. Then, the VPP Operator combines these types of data, in order to
decide the most profitable utilization of its assets. More specifically, when the
VPP Operator receives simultaneous requests for multiple services, the
algorithms of the software/tool that manages the storage-as-a-service (like the
WG STaaS/VPP tool) determines which batteries (prosumers) should participate
in each one. This decision is based both on the batteries’ characteristics, such as
their availability and cost functions with respect to their aging and losses and on
the forecast of the local production and consumption such that the prosumers’
convenience preferences are not violated. On the aggregation level, the VPP
Operator allocates the monetary amount paid by the DSO to its customers
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according to their contribution in the service realization, while keeping a
reasonable portion for its own services. Additionally, the VPP Operator may
gain revenues by requiring a participation fee from his members. Also, in this
scenario, the ESCO suggests the optimal consumption patterns at the local level,
to satisfy the request of the VPP Operator, and receives a portion of the offered
compensation for its services.
For all the preceding services, the BM may capture two alternatives with
respect to the batteries’ ownership. The former assumes that the prosumer pays
and owns the batteries—i.e., the batteries are considered as a capex cost for this
actor. In this situation, the BM will compute the added revenues that the
prosumer attains through the batteries due to increased economic coverage of
his own needs and active participation in ancillary services—compared to a
consumer who does not own batteries. The added revenues should exceed the
initial investment—the cost of purchasing and installing the batteries—within a
reasonable time interval in order of years and provide income to the prosumers
thereafter, till the end of their lifecycle.
The second case considers an additional actor in the value chain, namely
Storage Unit Operator (SUO), who bears the capex cost of the batteries and
installs them at the prosumers’ premises, aiming to offer storage services. This
actor may allocate only a portion of the batteries’ capacity for meeting the
prosumer’s needs and his revenue-maximization strategies at the local level,
while the rest may be assigned for providing services that are requested by the
VPP Operator. For its former contribution, this actor may receive revenues in
the same form as for the ESCOs which manage the energy management tools,
i.e., it exploits a portion of the added value created for the prosumers due to the
batteries’ presence. In this case, the contractual agreement between the two
parties must explicitly specify the portion of the batteries’ capacity which is
associated with local needs. Because its revenue streams are identical with those
of the ESCO, in what follows we assume for simplicity reasons that the ESCO
undertakes also the role of the SUO.
This business model may be extended to investigate the added value gained
by prosumers from the integration of EVs, due to their inherent storage
capabilities. The main difference with a conventional battery is both its capacity
limitations and its availability when needed to perform the services discussed
above—with the latter strongly dependent on the prosumer’s lifestyle pattern.
The EV primarily consumes enough electricity to cover the threshold of its own
transportation needs and supply for secondary devices. Thus, the EV is expected
to significantly increase the consumption of the households. As a result, the role
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of the ESCO in this case is even more crucial to provide the optimal consumption
schedules according to the varying prices within the planning horizon, while also
meeting the other objectives at the local (V2H) and aggregation (V2G) levels as
described above.
Concerning the regulatory barriers for the implementation of the
aforementioned business models, this Section focuses on those related with the
installation of the storage units and briefly mentions those which refer to the
operation of the VPP Operator. More specifically, the regulation of storage
assets faces many conceptual and practical challenges since there is no
consensus on the definition of storage assets. Particularly, whether storage assets
should be treated as generation assets or consumption units. This lack of clarity
stems from the fact that, while storage assets can generate electricity in the literal
sense of “generation,” the amount of electricity generated is typically not enough
to provide a net positive flow to the electricity system.16 On the other hand,
storage assets cannot be properly classified as consumption units because they
do not actually consume the energy that they take up. Could they also be
classified as part of a transmission or distribution network, given that they can
be a bridge asset between generators and final consumers? The answers to these
questions are fundamental to the development of an appropriate regulatory
regime as they impact on inter alia ownership, pricing and the imposition taxes
and levies.
For instance, in Spain, under the Electricity Sector Law 24/2013, battery
owners are not allowed to reduce the maximum power they have under contract
with their supplier.17 While it may be argued that this policy is intended to
maintain grid integrity, when coupled with the high self-consumption tax, the
regulatory regime for self-consumption and storage appears to be ill-considered.
In some cases, the regulatory framework not only does not promote, but rather,
hinders the development of storage. For example, in some countries taxation is
not favorable to storage, as typified by the “Grid Fee System.”18 Ordinarily, grid
fees are paid by the final consumers of power, as a fee for the transportation of
electricity through the grid network. In the case of storage, operators of storage
assets are first charged for charging the storage asset and then also for
discharging it, because of the notional double flow of electricity. In real terms,
the storage asset is neither a producer nor consumer. Therefore, the strict
16
Giorgio Castagneto et al., Regulatory Barriers to Energy Storage Deployment: The UK Perspective,
2016 RESTLESS PROJECT 1, 2.
17
See generally B.O.E. n. 310, Dec. 27, 2013 (Spain).
18
See Sören Amelang, Power Grid Fees—Unfair and Opaque?, CLEAN ENERGY WIRE (Jan. 26, 2017),
https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/power-grid-fees-unfair-and-opaque.
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application of the traditional grid fee model should not extend to storage assets.
Often, this double taxation is higher than power prices, resulting in a very strong
dis-incentivization of electricity storage.19
Finally, concerning the operation of the VPP aggregator, there are generally
no standardized contractual arrangements governing the roles and
responsibilities of this distinct actor. Furthermore, it is often impossible in
practice, or even not allowed by the law, to aggregate consumers’ flexibility.
Even though in some countries demand response is a commercially viable
product, remaining a key obstacle is the requirement for aggregators to get the
prior agreement of the customer’s supplier/balancing responsible party—needed
in order to be able to contract with the customer.20
Table 3 below is a generic business model description for prosumers-driven
energy storage integration in canvas form. Figure 5 offers a generic value
network for prosumers driven energy storage integration.
Table 3: Generic Business-Model Description for Prosumers-Driven
Energy Storage Integration in Canvas Form
Roles Involved
 Power consumption and production (role
performed by domestic / tertiary consumer with
installed RES units).
 Energy Storage (role performed by prosumer with
batteries or by the ESCO acting also as “Storage
Unit Operator”).
 EE & EM Services (role performed by the ESCO
which operates the functionalities of the energy
management tools).
 Power distribution (role performed by the DSO).
 Aggregator services (role performed by the VPP
Operator).
Value
Prosumer
Proposition
 Will be able to increase its self-consumption.
 Will be less dependent to the fluctuations of the
retail prices and thus will reduce his electricity
bill.
 Will be able to meet its energy demand at all
times.
19
Jason Deign, Spain’s New Self-Consumption Law Makes Batteries Impractical for Homeowners,
GREENTECH MEDIA (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/spanish-self-consumptionlaw-allows-batteries-at-a-cost.
20
SMART ENERGY DEMAND COALITION, supra note 15, at 55.
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Will be able to monitor its own production and
consumption.
Will be able to provide services to the VPP
Operator (aggregator) and thus generate
additional income.

Will be able to offer new and better services to its
clients, by the more efficient utilization of their
flexibility and self-production.
 Acting also as SUO, will be able to provide
multiple services (even at the same time) and thus
generate additional income streams.
 Will increase its customers and its penetration in
the market.
DSO
 Will be able to use storage units for grid services.
 Will be able to react fast on situations occurring
in the grid through low response times of storage
units.
 Will be able to locally solve grid congestions.
 Will profit from grid investment deferral when
storage units are deployed in a larger scale.
VPP Operator
 Will be able to provide services and flexibility to
the market and thus generate additional income.
 Will be able to monitor and control decentralized
storage units.
Prosumer (consumer with batteries and RES)
 Reduction of the energy bill through time-of use
management and enhanced self-consumption.
 Additional revenues from its more active
participation in DR events, and other services that
require the batteries installation.
ESCO
 Receive a portion of the prosumers’ revenues for
providing the energy management service
(optimal batteries scheduling at the local level).
 Acting also as SUO, receives a portion of the
prosumers’ revenues for providing the storage
capabilities and gains additional income from the
VPP Operator for its contribution in DR events
and ancillary services.
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Lower cost and thus higher profit through grid
investment deferral when storage units are
deployed or pooled in a larger scale.
VPP Operator
 Payment received by the DSO (or other actors)
for providing ancillary services and flexibility to
the relevant markets.
 Receives participation fee from the prosumers
who aim to become members of the VPP.
Prosumer (consumer with batteries and RES)
 The investment cost for buying and installing the
batteries.



ESCO




A portion of the achieved added value (revenues
for participating in DR events and offering
ancillary services, or decreased electricity bill of
the retailer) is given to the ESCO for its services
provision.
Participation fee to the VPP Operator.
Initial economic investment on software and
communication channels and technologies with a
storage-as-a-service management tool like the
WG STaaS/VPP.
Acting also as SUO, bears the capex cost of the
storage equipment and the relevant monitoring
and control devices.

DSO


Initial economic investment on software and
communication channels and technologies with a
storage-as-a-service management tool like the
WG STaaS/VPP.
VPP Operator
 Initial economic investment on software for
developing the storage-as-a-service management
tool, and for communication channels and
technologies with the energy management tools
like WiseHOME and WiseCORP.
 Participation fee to the ancillary and balancing
markets.
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Prosumer
 The regulatory framework may not allow the
potential savings to appear and consequently
hinder the development of storage (e.g., the Spain
case, where the battery owners are not allowed to
reduce the maximum power under contract with
their retailer).21
 Regulatory provisions may render business model
non-profitable, e.g., by maintaining network
charges on storage (charged for the double flow
of electricity).
ESCO

Acceptance of dynamic prices is rather low
around the EU.22 Consumer’s reluctance to join
such programs is prevalent. Such conditions do
not bring about the potential savings in the
electricity bill, therefore the engagement of the
ESCO becomes questionable.
 Uncertainty about inherent demand flexibility
available in various building typologies and
housed activities/operations.
VPP Operator
 Not clear regulatory definition of the role, rights,
obligations, function of Aggregator in all
European countries.
 Not an extended scaling up of advanced smart
meters enabling fast response to DR requests.
DSO
 All the barriers reported for the other participating
actors affects also the potential of the DSO to
request DR and ancillary services that may be
realized from the aggregation of small loads
(households).

See generally B.O.E. n. 310, Dec. 27, 2013 (Spain).
See Geert De Clereq, Run Your Dishwasher When the Sun Shines: Dynamic Power Pricing Grows,
REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2018, 2:53 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-electricity-prices-insight/runyour-dishwasher-when-the-sun-shines-dynamic-power-pricing-grows-idUSKBN1KN0L7.
22
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Figure 5: Generic Value Network for Prosumers Driven Energy Storage
Integration

4. Archetype BM for Exploiting Prosumers Flexibility—The Role of a
Virtual Power Plant
The archetype BM in this Section investigates the added value to be gained
by the participating actors in an explicit DR event. Central role in the BM has
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the Virtual Power Plant (VPP) which represents a basic component of an
interactive and dynamic distribution network, as a system that integrates many
resources, such as RES, energy storage systems, and flexible/controllable loads
of domestic and tertiary prosumers. According to the basic business scenario, at
the local level (for each individual household or tertiary building) these
resources are scheduled by the responsible ESCOs to regulate energy
management tools at the home and building level, like the WiseGRID,
WiseHOME, and WiseCORP tools, to optimally meet the needs of the
occupants. At the aggregation level, the production capacity and consumption
flexibility of these heterogeneous resources can be pooled, and the energy
surplus can be utilized to offer additional services. In that sense, the VPP
Operator acts as an aggregator and represents an intermediary between the
prosumer and energy markets, while its business role consists in identifying the
most profitable utilization of VPP resources.
More specifically, the VPP Operator can participate in Day-Ahead and
Intraday wholesale markets for selling the energy surplus and in the Balancing
markets for offering consumption flexibility and DR services to other actors of
the grid, e.g., the DSO.23 Aiming to maximize the revenues of its participants
while satisfying their convenience constraints, the VPP Operator first selects—
by means of the WiseCORP and WiseHOME tools—the forecasts of the local
RES production and combines it with the forecasted demand of its members
aiming to compute their surplus. Then, the VPP Operator compares the potential
revenues from the two markets and decides the most profitable schedule for its
assets: either sell the consumption surplus or store it to cover future local needs.
Additionally, the VPP Operator computes the most profitable schedule of
each individual VPP member’s resources. The VPP Operator’s tool (such as
the WG STaaS/VPP) sends these optimal strategies to each individual prosumer,
using the communication channels and the relevant tools.
In the case of a DR event, the VPP Operator explicitly requests from a subset
of its members their consumption shifting/shedding of a specific volume of
power within a specific time duration. For instance, the DSO may request the
self-consumption (or storage) of the RES production to avoid a curtailment, or
a consumption shift that would relieve its grid from congestion. Depending on
the VPP Operator’s contracts with its members, the VPP Operator may offer a
payment for the consumption rescheduling or may apply direct load control. In
the former case, the VPP Operator first chooses the most appropriate prosumers
23
See e.g., Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets, ISO: NEW ENGLAND, https://www.iso-ne.com/
markets-operations/markets/da-rt-energy-markets/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2020).
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to participate in the DR event, according to their potential in satisfying the DR
requirements and the level of compensation they request. The DR signal along
with the payment level is sent to the WiseCORP tool, which computes the
optimal rescheduling of the local devices. In the case of direct load control, the
VPP Operator computes and sends the optimal schedules for the devices in the
tertiary building, while the role of the WiseCORP tool is limited to their
implementation. In both schemes, the participation of the prosumers in the DR
is quantified by comparing their actual consumption during the event with their
individual baselines—consumption under normal conditions, in the absence of
DR request—which are derived by elaborating historical data. The VPP
Operator manages the compensations for its members according their
involvement and contribution to demand response campaigns and the energy
surplus provided. Concerning his revenue stream, the VPP Operator may require
a participation fee from each individual member and keep a portion of their
profits from their participation in the wholesale markets and the DR events.
Ultimately, the aim of this BM is to investigate the added value gained by
the prosumers from their participation in the VPP, due to the more efficient
utilization of their production and consumption-shifting capabilities both at local
and aggregation level, according to the advice of the VPP Operator. As
mentioned above, the additional potential revenues will be gained by purchasing
their production surplus in the wholesale market (compared e.g., with the
regulated feed-in tariffs or premiums for the participation of small-scale
producers below 10KW in the markets) and by participating in DR events.
Furthermore, this BM investigates the added value that will be provided by the
WG STaaS/VPP tool to the VPP Operator. The potential additional revenues are
expected to be realized mainly due to the optimization functionalities of the tool,
which allow the agent to decide the optimal assignment of the requested services
to its assets and consequently increase the set of services that may be offered
(e.g. increase the magnitude of demand shifting that the VPP Operator can offer
in the balancing market). Additionally, the optimal advice given to the
prosumers is expected to extend its clientele (more prosumers willing to become
members of the VPP) and thus its revenues. In this context, it becomes apparent
the crucial importance of the VPP Operator’s tool for his viable business
activity. More specifically, its sophistication must result to the real-time optimal
assignment of the VPP assets among the alternatives that arise in the wholesale
market (energy selling or DR participation). In this way, the VPP Operator will
be able to offer competitive bids to the DSO and achieve increased gains for its
members, a fact that results in an extended portfolio and higher market share.
The role of the ESCO in these scenarios is aligned with those in the other BMs—
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i.e., to reschedule the consumption of the devices at the local level—such that
the consumption pattern communicated by the VPP Operator is met.
For clarity, this archetype BM assumes that the prosumers own the RES.
Nevertheless, the BM and the relevant value network may be appropriately
modified to include also the case when a RESCO owns and operates the RES,
when this parameter is clarified in the pilot sites. The relevant contracts must be
carefully designed to resolve conflicting interests between the involved parties.
Such issues may arise in the case of a contract between a consumer and the
RESCO (renting his/her rooftop), which specifies the portion of generation that
may be consumed locally on an hourly basis. Then, if the VPP Operator require
from the consumer an explicit DR lasting for a shorter interval (e.g., half an
hour), the prosumer may require from the RESCO to consume all the agreed
portion of the local generation during the event, aiming to avoid the
inconvenience cost while earning the compensation by the VPP Operator. This
action may be against the interests of the RESCO if the wholesale price is high
at the same time, because it misses the opportunity to maximize the profits from
its generation.
Concerning the barriers that may prevent such BMs to be realized, we
distinguish between the technical and legislative perspective. As for the
technical perspective, many European countries lack a standardized framework
for the measurement of the baseline consumption. Which, as mentioned above,
is considered as a comparison benchmark for the quantification of the load
shifting/shedding during the DR event. Consequently, there may be an
inaccurate estimation of the consumer’s contribution. Thus, inadequate payment
for offering their flexibility, which clearly results in weak incentives for
participants. Furthermore, the business activity of the aggregator strongly
depends on the installation of certain infrastructures for real-time
communication of data and the automation of consumption rescheduling. The
key intuition here is to install smart meters, which are not yet deployed in most
EU Member States.24
Considering the legislative perspective, in many Member States aggregated
demand response is either illegal or its development is seriously hindered due to
regulatory barriers. Indeed, load aggregators are not present in every EU
Member State.25 The analogous consideration applies to regulatory frameworks
24
See Frédéric Simon, Smart Meter Woes Hold Back Digitalisation of EU Power Sector, EURACTIV
(Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/smart-meter-woes-hold-back-digitalisation-ofeu-power-sector/.
25
See generally Paolo Bertoldi, et. al, JRC Science for Policy Report: Demand Response Status in EU
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governing their operation. In Italy, “the notion of load aggregator is not formally
recognized and no regulatory framework currently exists.”26 Poland does not
seem to be taking the required steps to foster the development of incentive-based
(explicit) demand response.27
Other European countries still present important regulatory barriers, notably
program participation requirements not yet tailored for both generation and
demand-side resources. For example, Austria requires consumers “to install a
secured and dedicated telephone line to participate in the balancing market.”28
Norway requires TSO signals to be sent over the phone, which makes the
minimum bid-size high.29 As a result, the participation of consumers other than
large industrial consumers is hindered. Similarly, technical and organizational
rules do not consider some of the requirements for the provision of balancing
services in sufficient detail. Such as the negative impact of complex and lengthy
approval procedures, and their associated costs, on market entry and
participation.
Great Britain is deemed to have competitive energy markets and open
balancing markets, though uncertainties for demand response have been cast by
the emerging capacity market.30 Great Britain was the first EU Member State to
open many of its electricity markets to the demand side of things.31 Currently all
balancing markets allow the participation of demand response in general and
aggregated load in particular.32 However, according to the SEDC,
“measurement, baseline, bidding and other procedural and operational
requirements are inappropriate for demand-side resources[.]”33 Thus, even
though the markets are formally open, in practice, results in terms of demandside participation have been worsening over time. Furthermore, the capacity
remuneration mechanism introduced in 2014 is said not to place demand-side
resources on a “level playing field” with generation resources.34 Indeed, only

Member States (2016)).
26
RAFAEL LEAL-ARCAS, SOLUTIONS FOR SUSTAINABILITY: HOW THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE, ENERGY,
AND CLIMATE CHANGE REGIMES CAN HELP 378 (citing Paolo Bertoldi, et. al, supra note 25, at 69).
27
SMART ENERGY DEMAND COALITION, supra note 15, at 10–11.
28
Id. at 10.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 150.
31
See id. at 85.
32
See id.
33
Id.
34
See id. at 167.
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one demand-side aggregator out of around fifteen operating in the market
managed to secure a contract in the first capacity market auction.35
In Spain, even though some smart grid pilot projects are currently being
developed, incentive-base (explicit) demand response is currently modest.36
Even though there is one interruptible load program that allows incentive-based
(explicit) demand response, the scheme is only open to large consumers and has
not been used for several years.37 Importantly, load aggregation is illegal.38
Finally, even though load aggregators exist in some countries, such as France
and Belgium, at the moment their activities are focused on the high and medium
voltage levels of the transmission grid meaning that they only deal with the
TSOs.39 Clearly their business interaction must be extended also with the DSOs,
aiming to contribute to the proper operation of the grid at the low voltage level
(distribution).
Table 4 provides a generic business model description for exploiting
prosumers’ flexibility and Figure 6 below offers a generic value network for
prosumers driven energy storage integration.
Table 4: Generic Business Model Description for Exploiting Prosumers’
Flexibility
Actors Involved
 Prosumer
 ESCO
 VPP operator
 DSO
Roles Involved
 Power Consumption / Production and Energy
Storage: (role performed by either domestic or
tertiary consumer with batteries and RES
installed).
 Aggregator Services (role performed by the
VPP Operator managing the WG STaaS / VPP
tool).
 EE & EM Services (role performed by the
ESCO, managing the energy management
tools like WiseGRID’s WiseHOME and
WiseCORP).

35
36
37
38
39

Id. at 85.
Id. at 131.
See id. at 79.
Id. at 10, 41, 45, 47, 68, 85, 131, 151.
See id. at 72; see also id. at 155.
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Power Distribution (role performed by the
DSO, managing the WG Cockpit tool for
sending the DR requests).
Prosumer
 Will be able to schedule its consumption,
production, and storage capabilities more
efficiently.
 Will be able to sell its production surplus to
the wholesale market.
 Will receive additional revenues from its
flexibility capabilities and its participation in
explicit DR events.
 Will have the opportunity to give its
contribution for the environment protection,
when participating in explicit DR events for
the RES curtailment avoidance.
ESCO
 Will decide the optimal schedules of the
devices at the local level and thus increase its
revenues (as a portion of the prosumer’s
profits).
VPP Operator
 Will provide a combination of services, thus
utilizing more efficiently the assets of its
members.
 Will provide optimal schedules and thus
increase its clientele.
 Will manage better its internal resources in
order to decide more efficiently if it is more
profitable to store or sell the energy surplus.
 Will be able to provide explicit DR services,
thus increasing its earning.
DSO
 Will be able to receive in an easier way
support for balancing the grid by means of the
DR services provided by VPP operators.
Prosumer
 Payments from the aggregator for its
contribution in the explicit DR events.
VPP Operator
 Revenues for operating as an intermediary
between the prosumers and the energy markets
(receives a portions of the prosumers’ profits).
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Revenues for providing DR services to the
DSO.
 Receives a flat fee from the prosumers for
their participation in the VPP.
EE&EM
 Revenues for providing the sophistication of
the energy management tools’ functionalities.
Their revenues may be either a portion of the
compensation provided to prosumers for their
participation in explicit DR events, or a fixed
fee paid by the prosumers (or their
combination).
DSO
 Decreased operational costs by avoiding the
grid congestion and RES curtailment.
Prosumer
 Part of its revenues will be given to the ESCO
for the optimal schedule of the local devices.
 Payment to the VPP Operator for becoming a
member of the VPP.
VPP Operator
 Economic investment for the development and
operation of the software (such as the WG
STaaS/VPP tools) and communication
channels and technologies with the
WiseHOME/WiseCORP and WG Cockpit
tools, aiming to receive and send flexibility
requests and compute the optimal schedules at
aggregation level.
 Payments to VPP participants for their
involvement in the DR services realization and
for their power production.
 Payments to the market’s operator for market
participation (not appearing in the value
network).
ESCO
 Economic investment for the development and
operation of the software tools for energy
management and communication channels and
technologies with the WG STaaS/VPP, aiming
to receive flexibility requests and compute the
optimal schedules at local level.
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Economic investment for the development and
operation of the software (like the WG
Cockpit tool), and communication channels
and technologies with the WG STaaS/ VPP,
aiming to send flexibility requests.
 Payment to the VPP Operator for provisioning
the DR services.
Prosumer
 The lack of a standardized framework for the
measurement of the baseline consumption and
the inadequate installed equipment (smart
meters) prevent the revenues from their
contribution in DR events to be realized and
hinder their active participation in such
programs.
VPP Operator
 The same barriers as mentioned above for the
prosumer.
 The regulatory barriers in many member
states, where the aggregation of small loads is
illegal, or do not guarantee a level playing
field for the competitive participation of the
aggregators in the balancing markets.
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Figure 6: Generic Value Network for Prosumers Driven Energy Storage
Integration
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II. UNITED KINGDOM
A. Overview
This Section enumerates the energy strategy, policy framework and
regulatory architecture underpinning the United Kingdom’s smart grid
transition. It will further analyze the progress that the UK has made against its
own strategic objectives in light of the WiseGRID project’s principal aim to:
contribute to the energy sector new technologies and solutions for the
improvement of the smartness, stability, and security of the European energy
grid. In the hopes of further stimulating this discussion, this Section will
conclude by evaluating the UK’s responses to the challenges that have arisen
during its transition process.
The UK has set a series of targets for renewable energy. By 2020, the UK
wants to derive 15% of its energy consumption from renewable energy sources.
It has set individual targets for electricity (30%), heat (12%), and transport
(10%).40 It has also set an ambitious energy savings target, attempting to reduce
its final energy consumption by 18% compared to 2007 levels.41 Finally, the UK
has committed to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050,
compared to 1990 levels.42
The UK has made great strides towards weaning itself off its traditional,
coal-based energy industries. The nuclear industry remains a central plank of the
UK’s energy strategy and is set to play a key role in the provision of clean,
reliable energy to meet future demand. A number of nuclear projects are
currently in the development pipeline.43 Renewable energy also plays an
important role, particularly in Scotland.44 Controversially, however, the UK is a
proponent of hydraulic fracking: the drilling for shale gas.45 The re-

40

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE, NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY ACTION PLAN FOR
5 (UK) [hereinafter
DECC 2010].
41
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE, UK NATIONAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION PLAN,
DECC, at 87 (UK) [hereinafter DECC 2014].
42
Climate Change Act 2008, c.27, §1 (Eng.).
43
See generally John Parnell, Momentum Builds for UK Government to Self-Fund New Nuclear Plants,
GTM (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/momentum-builds-for-uk-government-tofund-new-nuclear-itself.
44
See Sophie Hirsh, Scotland’s New Target: 100% Renewable Electricity in 2020, WORLD ECON. FORUM,
(July 17, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/07/scotland-wind-energy-new-record-putting-countryon-track-for-100-renewable-electricity-in-2020/.
45
See What is Fracking and Why is it Controversial, BBC NEWS (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/
news/uk-14432401.
THE UNITED KINGDOM: ARTICLE 4 OF THE RENEWABLE ENERGY DIRECTIVE 2009/28/EC, at
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commencement of operations in 2018 is at odds with its efforts to reduce carbon
output.
The UK considers itself a leader in the green transition, and it has made solid
progress towards many of its targets. In 2017, the UK saw renewable energy’s
share of electricity generation jump to 29.3%.46 With the UK now comfortably
producing one quarter of its electricity from renewables, the overall target of
15% of its consumption from renewables seems increasingly achievable.
Primary energy consumption fell by 15% and final energy consumption by 11%
in 2015, compared to 2007.47 By 2017, UK emissions were 43% below 1990
levels.48
Notwithstanding its progress, there is widespread acknowledgement that
efforts must accelerate if the UK is to reach its targets. There are particular
concerns about a downward trend in green investment. The withdrawal of
governmental support at a time of considerable market uncertainty appears to
have compounded investor uncertainty.49 A hostile planning environment for
onshore wind developments has also troubled proponents of the technology.50
Obstacles to the full integration of storage and demand response technologies
also remain in place.
With regard to smart metering technologies, the UK has been at the forefront
of the smart meter transition. However, its Smart Metering Implementation
Programme has also not been without its challenges.51 There are a number of
novel aspects about the UK’s approach to the roll-out, but the one that has caused
perhaps the most issues for the UK has been the decision to place the roll-out in
the hands of the utility suppliers.
Thus, the policy framework for the low carbon transition is a mixed bag.
While ostensibly in favor of the low-carbon transition, the implementation of
46
DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, DIGEST OF UNITED KINGDOM ENERGY STATISTICS
(DUKES) 2018: MAIN REPORT 1, 11 (2018) [hereinafter DIGEST OF UNITED KINGDOM ENERGY STATISTICS].
47
UK GOVERNMENT, 28 APRIL 2017: UK NATIONAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION PLAN AND ANNUAL
REPORT, 1 (UK) [hereinafter UK NATIONAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION PLAN].
48
How the UK is Progressing, COMM. ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://www.theccc.org.uk/tacklingclimate-change/reducing-carbon-emissions/how-the-uk-is-progressing/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2020).
49
Josh Gabbatiss, A ‘Hostile Environment’ for Renewables: Why has UK Clean Energy Investment
Plummeted?, INDEPENDENT (May 19, 2018, 7:14 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/ukrenewable-energy-investment-targets-wind-solar-power-onshore-a8358511.html.
50
Josh Gabbatiss, Environmental Impact of Policies that Led to Collapse of Onshore Wind Was Not
Considered by Government, THE INDEPENDENT (May 6, 2018, 11:30 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/
news/uk/politics/wind-power-onshore-policies-environmental-impact-government-collapse-a8334786.html.
51
See generally Smart Metering Implementation Programme, SMART ENERGY CODE CO., https://
smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/smip/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2020).
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policy continues to be informed by the incumbent market players. The
consequential lack of clarity has allowed a climate of confusion to set in, with
apparent knock-on effects for investment. Accordingly, while the strategic goals
are clear, the implementation leaves plenty to be desired.
B. Energy Profile
1. Energy Mix
a. UK’s Targets
Decarbonization plays a key part in the UK’s energy strategy by virtue of a
series of European and international commitments. With regard to the UK’s
renewable energy targets, 15% of the UK’s energy consumption will be derived
from renewable energy sources by 2020.52 Sub-targets for electricity (30%), heat
(12%), and transport (10%) have also been set.53 The UK’s progress is monitored
and reported every two years, by reference to its targets and the detailed roadmap
set out in its National Renewable Energy Action Plan.54
The UK has also committed to making ambitious energy savings, with a
target to reduce its final energy consumption by 18% relative to 2007 levels.55
Finally, under the Climate Change Act 2008 the UK has committed to reduce its
greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050, compared to 1990 levels.56
b. UK’s Energy Mix
In 2017, up to 80% of the UK’s primary energy consumption was from fossil
fuels, mainly oil and natural gas.57 However, the share of fossil fuels has
declined in recent years, driven by a significant decline in coal production.58

52

DECC 2010, supra note 40, at 5.
Id.
54
See id. at 4.
55
DECC 2014, supra note 41, at 5.
56
See Simon Evans, In-Depth Q & A: The UK Becomes First Major Economy to Set Net-Zero Climate
Goal, CARBON BRIEF: CLEAR ON CLIMATE (June 12, 2019, 4:18 PM), https://www.carbonbrief.org/in-depth-qathe-uk-becomes-first-major-economy-to-set-net-zero-climate-goal.
57
Jocelyn Timperley, Six Charts Show Mixed Progress for UK Renewables, CARBON BRIEF: CLEAR ON
CLIMATE (July 30, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.carbonbrief.org/six-charts-show-mixed-progress-for-ukrenewables.
58
See id.
53
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Overall primary energy production in the UK increased by 1.2% in 2016
compared to 2015,59 primarily due to the new fields starting production in the
UK Continental Shelf (UKCS)—more projects have been recently announced.60
As a result, there was a rise in the production of primary oil (42%) and natural
gas (32%).61 Coal production was reduced due to both the 2015 closure of the
last large deep mines and a decline in electricity generator demand.62 Indeed,
coal accounted for only 2% of total production in 2016—a record low.63 The
shift from coal to gas is the most striking development in the UK’s fuel mix over
the past half-century. Primary electricity sources (nuclear, wind, and solar),
bioenergy, and waste accounted for 16% and 9% of total production in 2016,
respectively.64
The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS)
publishes quarterly statistical reports on energy trends. As of September 2018,
BEIS reports that natural gas and petroleum remained the most important
sources of indigenous energy production.65 However, the share of coal was
negligible; indeed, in the most recent quarter,66 the outputs of (1) nuclear; (2)
wind, solar and hydro; and (3) bioenergy and waste were considerably higher.
Concerning electricity generation, approximately 42% of electricity was
generated from gas in quarter 2 of 2018; coal’s share continued to decline, falling
to 1.6%.67 Meanwhile, generation from low-carbon (nuclear and renewable)
sources provided more than half of the generation (53.4%).68 The renewable
generation share was 31.7%.69
Efforts to improve the UK’s renewable energy position have been bolstered
by, among other things, the ongoing work at the Drax power plant facility.70
59
DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, UK ENERGY IN BRIEF 2017 1, 6. [hereinafter UK
ENERGY IN BRIEF 2017].
60
BP Development of Two New Fields Demonstrates Remaining Potential of UKCS, OGUK, https://
oilandgasuk.co.uk/bp-development-of-two-new-fields-demonstrates-remaining-potential-of-ukcs/ (last visited
Oct. 18, 2019).
61
UK ENERGY IN BRIEF 2017, supra note 59, at 6.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, ENERGY TRENDS: SEPTEMBER 2018, 5 [hereinafter
ENERGY TRENDS: SEPTEMBER 2018].
66
At the time of writing this Article.
67
ENERGY TRENDS: SEPTEMBER 2018, supra note 65, at 48.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 3.
70
See Jillian Ambrose, Drax Owner Plans to Be World’s First Carbon-Negative Business, GUARDIAN
(Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/dec/10/drax-owner-plans-worlds-first-carbonnegative-business.
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Previously a coal-fired generation facility, efforts are underway to secure a coalfree future for the plant.71 Following the conversion of four of its coal units,
Drax now has four biomass generating units—the remaining two coal units will
soon be replaced with gas-fired power generating units.72 However, efforts to
reduce carbon output will almost certainly be hampered not just by the
development of the UKCS, but also by the re-commencement of the UK’s
hydraulic fracking program.73
Nuclear power continues to play an important role in the UK’s low-carbon
transition strategy. Around fifteen nuclear reactors generate approximately 21%
of the UK’s energy.74 While half of this capacity is due to retire by 2025, the
Government has worked hard to create a favorable policy for nuclear energy,
with a number of several new projects now in the pipeline. The most prominent
among these may be the EDF-led Hinkley Point C project. Hinkley Point C will
provide 3.2GW of secure, base-load, low carbon electricity for at least sixty
years.75 EDF is also developing the Sizewell C project.76
In addition to its nuclear strategy, the UK is increasing its renewable
electricity generation capabilities: in quarter 2 of 2018, renewables accounted
for 31.7% of electricity generation—a record high.77 Since 2012, the UK has
halved carbon emissions in the electricity generation sector; it now boasts the
fourth cleanest power system in Europe.78
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the UK’s reliance on gas hinders its ability
to meet its emission targets and provides an incentive to maintain high levels of
carbon output. This remains an area where considerable progress could and
should be made, particularly in light of the UK’s change of fortune with respect
to for its security of supply. Given the historically significant supplies of
indigenous fossil fuel resources, the UK has historically occupied a position as
a net exporter of energy. However, this changed in the course of the early 2000s,
with the UK became a net importer of energy. In quarter 2 of 2018, it was
71

Id.
Drax Closer to Coal Free Future with Fourth Biomass Unit Conversion, DRAX (Aug. 20, 2018),
https://www.drax.com/press_release/drax-closer-coal-free-future-fourth-biomass-unit-conversion/.
73
DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, GUIDANCE ON FRACKING: DEVELOPING SHALE GAS IN
THE UK.
74
Nuclear Power in the United Kingdom, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS. (Nov. 2018), http://www.worldnuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/united-kingdom.aspx.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
ENERGY TRENDS: SEPTEMBER 2018, supra note 65, at 48.
78
UK Enjoyed ‘Greenest Year for Electricity Ever’ in 2017, BBC (Dec. 28, 2017), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/uk-42495883.
72
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reported by BEIS that the UK remains a net importer of energy, with 34.1% of
its energy supplied by imports. In 2017, the UK’s net import dependency was
35.8%—a decline from 2016.79
In terms of the UK’s “greening” of the electricity mix, it would be remiss
not to emphasize the important leadership role of Scotland in the low-carbon
transition. Renewables were the single largest source of electricity generated in
Scotland in 2015, commanding 42% of generation.80 For comparison purposes,
nuclear comprised 35% and fossil fuels 22% of electricity generated.81 Scotland
is also a net exporter of electricity, exporting almost 30% of the total generation
in 2015.82 However, it is notable that Scotland is a devolved region of the UK.
While energy policy remains centralized in the Westminster Government,
Scotland has the power of planning rules, for example. A discussion on energy
in the UK should note further that Scotland as a region has been agitating for
independence in recent years: the last referendum, which resulted in a “remain”
vote, was held in 2014.83 The Scottish Government is currently focusing its
efforts on getting a “good deal” for Scotland out of Brexit, but if a “good deal”
cannot be struck, another referendum may be held.84 Although a hypothetical
scenario, it is important to note that the composition of the UK’s energy mix
would likely look very different in Scotland’s absence. The rest of the UK’s
progress has lagged significantly behind that of Scotland’s. Accordingly,
Scotland helps to inflate the overall figures for the UK. If Scotland were to
become independent, the rest of the UK would no longer be able to take
Scotland’s energy statistics into account when reporting on and monitoring the
UK’s progress. The UK Government must take this into consideration when
formulating its energy strategy. In particular, the UK Government must ensure
that each of the southern regions is harnessing to the fullest extent the lowcarbon resources available to them, in order to match if not exceed the progress
being made north of the border.

79

ENERGY TRENDS: SEPTEMBER 2018, supra note 65, at 14.
High Level Summary of Statistics Trend Last update: Thursday, December 22, 2016 Electricity
Generation,
SCOTTISH
GOVERNMENT,
https://www2.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Business/
TrenRenEnergy (last visited Feb. 13, 2020).
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
See Philip Sim, Scottish Independence: Could a New Referendum Still Be Held?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 31,
2020).
84
Scott MacNab, Nicola Sturgeon: I Won’t Call a Second Scottish Independence Vote This Year,
SCOTSMAN (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/general-election/nicola-sturgeon-i-wont-call-a-second-scottish-independence-vote-this-year-1-4835640.
80
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c. UK’s Progression Against Its Targets
The reports on the UK’s progress against its targets have been mixed. At
times, the UK has appeared to lag significantly behind its European neighbors.85
At other times, it would seem to be on course to hit—and potentially surpass—
its targets.86 The UK’s NREAP, published in 2010, acknowledged that efforts to
integrate renewable energy resources into the fuel mix will need to accelerate if
the UK is to meet its 2020 targets.87 In 2017, the UK saw renewable energy’s
share of electricity generation jump to 29.3%.88 With the UK now comfortably
producing one-quarter of its electricity from renewables, the overall target of
15% consumption from renewables seems increasingly achievable. Electricity
generation from coal amounted to a mere 1.6% in quarter 2 of 2018, while
natural gas remained dominant with a share of 42% (compared to 2% and 41.3%
in quarter 2 of 2017, respectively).89 The share of renewables grew from 30.6%
in quarter 2 of 2017 to 31.7% in quarter 2 of 2018. These figures are indicative
of a shift away from fossil fuels for electricity generation purposes.
Concerning the UK’s energy savings target, energy consumption is on a
general downward trend.90 Indeed, primary energy consumption fell by 15% and
final energy consumption by 11% in 2015 as compared to 2007.91 However, the
UK still needs to achieve an 18% reduction in final energy consumption by 2020
(a 20% reduction in primary energy consumption).
By 2017, UK greenhouse gas emissions were 44% below 1990 levels.92 The
UK managed to meet its first carbon budget (2008–2012) and is, according to
the Committee on Climate Change, likely to outperform its second (2013–2017)
and third (2018–2022) budgets. However, it may struggle to meet its fourth
budget, covering 2023–2027.
The role of Scotland in the UK’s achievement of its targets should be
highlighted. Scotland exceeded its 2020 target to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by 42% six years early.93 Meanwhile, 2017 was a record year for
85
Alan Martin, The UK Still Has Some Way to Go to Hit Its 2020 Renewable Energy Target, ALPHR
(Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.alphr.com/energy/1008375/uk-renewable-energy-progress-2020.
86
UK Set to Smash Renewable Energy Targets for 2020, SOLAR DAILY (June 1, 2018), http://www.
solardaily.com/reports/UK_set_to_smash_renewable_energy_targets_for_2020_999.html.
87
DECC 2010, supra note 40, at 5.
88
DIGEST OF UNITED KINGDOM ENERGY STATISTICS, supra note 46, at 11.
89
ENERGY TRENDS: SEPTEMBER 2018, supra note 65, at 48.
90
UK NATIONAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION PLAN, at 1.
91
Id.
92
How the UK is Progressing, supra note 48.
93
Scotland Exceeds Emissions Targets–Six Years Early, BBC (June 14, 2016), https://www.bbc.co.uk/
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Scotland, with 68.1% of electricity derived from renewable sources.94 But while
Scotland’s runaway success helps to bolster the UK’s overall figures, it does
mean that the UK is heavily dependent on Scotland for renewable energy
resources. If Scotland were to become an independent nation in the future, then
the UK’s low carbon status would take a serious hit.
2. Market and Market Players
a. Market
The electricity and gas markets in the UK are fully privatized, both at
wholesale and retail levels. The electricity market in the UK is divided into two
networks. On the one hand, England, Scotland, and Wales form the Great Britain
(GB) system. On the other hand, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland
(also referred to as “Ireland”) constitute the Integrated Single Electricity Market
(I-SEM).
The GB market is regulated by the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority
(GEMA), which operates through the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets
(Ofgem). Meanwhile, the I-SEM is regulated jointly by Northern Ireland’s
Utility Regulator (UREGNI), and the Irish regulator, Commission of Regulation
of Utilities (CRU). The decision-making body responsible for the governance of
the SEM is the SEM Committee, which is comprised of the CRU, Utility
Regulator, and an independent member.
The GB market is operated by National Grid in its guise as the Electricity
System Operator. Meanwhile, the SEM is operated by the SEM Operator or
SEM-O.
b. Market Players
i. Great Britain
The GB market is largely decentralized and privatized. Only the regulator,
Ofgem, is a governmental body. The transmission system is divided into three
regions, owned and operated by the same three entities: (1) National Grid
Electricity Transmission (NGET) in England and Wales; (2) Scottish Power
Transmission; and (3) Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission in Scotland (each a
news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-36519506.
94
‘Record’ Year for Renewable Electricity Generation, BBC (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/uk-scotland-scotland-business-43586438.
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“Transmission System Operator” or TSO). The GB transmission system as a
whole is operated by the System Operator, National Grid. Ownership of the
transmission network has been certified by the Commission as fully unbundled,
with the Scottish TSOs certified under Article 9(9) of Directive 2009/72/EC.95
The GB market will be undergoing an important change during the period
until 2030 when the GB distribution network operators (DNOs) transition into
distribution system operators (DSOs).96 This far-reaching change will see the
operator adopt a more active role in the management of electricity generation
and consumption. It should also enable customers to play a more active role as
both producers and consumers. Presently, ownership and operation of the
distribution network is divided up between a number of DNOs.
The retail electricity market is fully open to competition, with a range of
domestic and non-domestic suppliers active in the market. In June 2018, there
were seventy-three active domestic suppliers.97 However, the retail market is
presently dominated by six large, vertically integrated suppliers known as the
“Big 6.”98 An important aspect of the GB retail market is the ownership of the
big utility suppliers by international companies. EDF Energy is wholly owned
by the French state-owned EDF.99 Npower is presently a subsidiary of the
German company, Innogy SE (itself a subsidiary of RWE).100 E.ON UK is part
of the E.ON group, headquartered in Germany.101 Scottish Power is a subsidiary
of the Spanish giant, Iberdrola.102 SSE and British Gas remain British-owned
companies, although British Gas is a subsidiary of the UK-owned and based
Centrica.103
Notably, both E.ON and RWE underwent drastic corporate restructurings in
2016, in response to Germany’s so-called “Energiewende.”104 RWE hived off
95
Single Market Progress Report: United Kingdom, EUR. COMM’N, COM (2014) 634 final, at 232 (Oct.
13, 2014).
96
Open Networks Project: Overview, ENERGY NETWORKS ASSOCIATION, http://www.energynetworks.
org/electricity/futures/open-networks-project/open-networks-project-overview/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2020).
97
See Number of Active Domestic Suppliers by Fuel Type (GB), OFGEM https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/dataportal/number-active-domestic-suppliers-fuel-type-gb (last updated Jan. 2020).
98
OFGEM, RETAIL ENERGY MARKETS IN 2016, at 9 (2016) [hereinafter RETAIL ENERGY MARKETS].
99
A Beginner’s Guide to the Big 6 Energy Companies, OVO ENERGY, https://www.ovoenergy.com/
guides/energy-guides/big-six-energy-companies.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2020).
100
Tom Käckenhoff & Philip Blenkinsop, E.ON to Tackle Npower After EU Clears Innogy Takeover,
REUTERS (Sep. 17, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-innogy-m-a-e-on-eu/e-on-to-tackle-npower-aftereu-clears-innogy-takeover-idUSKBN1W20S2.
101
Id.
102
A Beginner’s Guide to the Big 6 Energy Companies, supra note 99.
103
Id.
104
Guy Chazan, Eon and RWE Pursue Radical Restructurings, FIN. TIMES (May 18, 2016), https://www.
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its renewable energy, network, and retail businesses into Innogy SE, with thethen Npower becoming a subsidiary of the latter and renamed as Npower
Limited.105 RWE Generation UK PLC acquired the coal, natural gas, and oilfired plants formerly operated by Npower.106 Meanwhile, E.ON created a new
subsidiary, Uniper, to keep its fossil fuel assets.107 E.ON retained the
renewables, distribution, and retail businesses.108 There are reports that Npower
will be acquired from Innogy SE by E.ON UK, as part of a planned asset swap
between RWE and E.ON.109
Table 5 outlining the different market players in the GB market is provided
below.
Table 5: The Different Market Players in the Great Britain Market
Regulatory Authority Ofgem
Generators

Fossil-fuel, Renewable, Nuclear, and Aggregators.
England and Wales: National Grid Electricity
Transmission PLC (NGET)

Transmission Asset
Owner

Transmission System
Operator

Scotland: Scottish Power Transmission Limited (Scottish
Power) and Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission PLC
(Scottish Hydro)—note that Scottish Hydro now trades as
Scottish & Southern Electricity Networks.
The GB system as a whole is operated by a single System
Operator, National Grid.
Three regional Transmission Operators operate within
their distinct transmission areas:
(1) England and Wales: NGET
(2) Southern Scotland: Scottish Power

ft.com/content/316ce884-1cdc-11e6-a7bc-ee846770ec15.
105
Tom Käckenhoff & Philip Blenkinsop, E.ON to Tackle Npower after EU Clears Innogy Takeover,
REUTERS (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-innogy-m-a-e-on-eu/e-on-to-tackle-npower-after-euclears-innogy-takeover-idUSKBN1W20S2.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Adam Vaughan, Job Fears for Npower Staff, with Ownership Transferring to E.ON, GUARDIAN
(Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/dec/28/job-fears-for-npower-staff-with-ownershiptransferring-to-eon.
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(3) Northern Scotland and the Scottish Isles: Scottish
Hydro/SSE
Electricity North West Limited
Northern Powergrid owns DNOs Northern Powergrid
(Northeast) Limited and Northern Powergrid (Yorkshire)
PLC
Scottish and Southern Energy owns DNOs Scottish Hydro
Electric Power Distribution PLC and Southern Electric
Power Distribution PLC
Distribution Network
Operator (groups
Scottish Power Energy Networks owns DNOs SP
and individual
Distribution Ltd and SP Manweb PLC
operators)
UK Power Networks owns London Power Networks
PLC, South Eastern Power Networks PLC, and Eastern
Power Networks PLC

System Operator

Suppliers

Consumers

Western Power Distribution owns Western Power
Distribution (East Midlands) PLC, Western Power
Distribution (West Midlands) PLC, Western Power
Distribution (South West) PLC, and Western Power
Distribution (South Wales) PLC
National Grid
The UK market is dominated by the “Big Six” largest
suppliers: British Gas, EDF Energy, E.ON, Npower,
Scottish Power, and SSE (holding as of Q3 2017 81% of
electricity, and 80% gas supply). Note that the “Big Six”
will be consolidated to the “Big Five” if the proposed
asset swap between RWE and E.ON goes ahead.
As of June 2018 (quarter 2), some seventy-three active
domestic suppliers were in operation.
Industry, Commercial, SMEs, Residential

ii. Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland is part of the I-SEM with Ireland, so different arrangements
apply.

LEAL-ARCASETALPROOFS_3.25.20

2020]

5/3/2020 12:22 PM

FINANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY

487

The Northern Ireland transmission system is owned by Northern Ireland
Electricity Networks (NIE Networks), a private entity, and operated by SONI.110
SONI is owned by the Irish TSO, EirGrid, which is an Irish state-owned
entity.111 NIE Networks is also the owner and operator of the distribution
system.112 Notably, NIE Networks is owned by the Irish state-owned utility
company, the Electricity Supply Board (ESB), which acquired NIE Networks
from Viridian in December 2010.113 Article 9(9) of Directive 2009/72/EC has
been applied to Northern Ireland.114
The Northern Irish retail market is open to the competition but has far fewer
players. The incumbent, Power NI, dominates in the domestic sector.115 Note
that Viridian Group PLC is a hugely dominant player in the Northern Ireland
retail market: it owns both Power NI and Energia, the supply businesses which
it retained following the acquisition of NIE Networks by ESB in 2010.
Accordingly, Viridian has influenced both the domestic and commercial retail
markets.
A Table 6 outlining the different market players in the I-SEM may be found
below.
Table 6: The Integrated Single Electricity Market Between Northern
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland
Republic of Ireland
Northern Ireland
Regulatory
CRU
UREGNI
Authority
Generators

Fossil fuels, Renewable,
Demand-Side units,
Aggregators

Transmission Asset
ESB
Owner
Transmission System
EirGrid
Operator

Fossil fuels, Renewable,
Demand-Side units,
Aggregators
Northern Ireland Electricity
(NIE) Networks Limited
SONI

110
Our Company History, N. IR. ELECTRICITY NETWORKS (2019), https://www.nienetworks.co.uk/aboutus/company-history.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Council Directive 2009/72 art. 9 O.J. (L 211) 1.
115
UTILITY REGULATOR, RETAIL MARKET MONITORING 3 (2018) [hereinafter RETAIL MARKET
MONITORING].
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Distribution Asset
ESB
Owner
Distribution System
ESB Networks Limited
Operator
Market Operator
SEMO
BEenergy, Bord Gais
Energy, Electric Ireland,
Energia, Go Power, Just
Energy, Naturgy, Panda
Suppliers
Power, Pinergy, Prepay
Power, SSE Airtricity,
Vayu116
Consumers

Industry, Commercial,
SMEs, Residential

[Vol. 34

NIE Networks Limited
NIE Networks Limited
SEMO
Electric Ireland, SSE
Airtricity, Click Energy,
Budget Energy, Energia,
Go Power/LLC Power,
Power NI, Vayu, 3T
Power117
Industry, Commercial,
SMEs, Residential

c. Customer Profile and Consumption Trends
i. Great Britain
In terms of overall energy consumption in the GB market, transport
continues to hoard the lion’s share of consumption. In 2017, transport accounted
for 40% of final energy consumption.118 The domestic sector followed,
representing 28%.119 The industry and the services sectors made up the rest with
shares of 17% and 15%, respectively.120
The GB electricity market can be divided into two segments: domestic and
non-domestic. The non-domestic segment includes small businesses, up to large
industrial and commercial users.121 As of March 2016, non-domestic users
accounted for 64% of total electricity consumption, and 39% of gas.122
Concerning electricity consumption, there is a general pattern of declining
consumption: total consumption decreased by 1% in quarter 2 of 2018 compared
to quarter 2 of 2017.123

116
List of Energy Suppliers, CRU, https://www.cru.ie/home/customer-care/energy/communication/ (last
visited Feb. 19, 2020).
117
RETAIL MARKET MONITORING, supra note 115, at 5.
118
DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, UK ENERGY IN BRIEF 2018, at 8.
119
DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN THE UK (2018).
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id, at 5
123
ENERGY TRENDS: SEPTEMBER 2018, supra note 65, at 3.

LEAL-ARCASETALPROOFS_3.25.20

2020]

FINANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY

5/3/2020 12:22 PM

489

ii. Northern Ireland
The Northern Ireland electricity market can be similarly divided into
domestic and non-domestic customers. In 2016, of the total customers in the
electricity market in Northern Ireland, 91.7% were in the domestic sector; 8.3%
were business customers.124 But while the domestic sector accounted for 36.5%
of consumption, the non-domestic sector accounted for the lion’s share of
consumption, at 63.5%.125
In the period 2015–2016, domestic electricity consumption in Northern
Ireland was around 2,925 GWh.126 Non-domestic consumption was around
4,705 GWh.127 A slight downward trend in annual electricity consumption in
Northern Ireland over the period 2010–2017 has been observed. The total
consumption in 2017 was 7.7% lower than 2010 levels.128
3. Transmission System
a. Great Britain
The GB system transmits high-voltage electricity through a transmission
grid and has overhead lines ranging from 400kV to 275kV and below.129
Three entities provide the high-voltage network within their onshore
transmission areas: (1) National Grid Electricity Transmission PLC (NGET) for
England and Wales;130 (2) Scottish Power Transmission Limited for Southern
Scotland; and (3) Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission PLC for Northern
Scotland and the Scottish island groups.131 The GB system as a whole is operated
by a single System Operator, National Grid.
The UK’s transmission network is bolstered by four interconnectors: (1)
England-France with “IFA” (2GW); (2) England-Netherlands with “BritNed”
124

UTILITY REGULATOR, RETAIL MARKET MONITORING: 2016, at 6 (2017).
Id.
126
DEP’T FOR ECON.: NORTHERN IRELAND STAT. & RES. AGENCY, ENERGY IN NORTHERN IRELAND 2018,
at 36 (2018).
127
Id.
128
Id. at 29.
129
Map of the UK’s Electricity Supply System Network Grid, BRITISH BUS. ENERGY (Apr. 2, 2016),
https://britishbusinessenergy.co.uk/electricity-supply-system/.
130
Kirstie Massie & Katy Norman, United Kingdom, WHITE & CASE LLP, 3, https://www.whitecase.com/
sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/getting-deal-through-electricity-regulation-2018-unitedkingdom.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2020).
131
See The GB Electricity Transmission Network, OFGEM, https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/
transmission-networks/gb-electricity-transmission-network (last visited Feb. 19, 2020).
125
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(1GW); (3) Northern Ireland-Scotland with “Moyle” (500 MW); and (4) WalesIreland with “East West” (500 MW).132 The UK has one of the lowest electricity
interconnection rates among EU Members, with an interconnection rate of 6%
in 2014.133 Several measures will have to be put in place if the UK is going to
reach its target—set by the European Commission—of 10% interconnection by
2020.134
b. Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland’s transmission network consists of a series of 275kV and
110 kV lines.135 In Northern Ireland, the TSO is the System Operator for
Northern Ireland Limited (SONI).136 SONI is a subsidiary of EirGrid, which is
the TSO in the Republic of Ireland.137
The electricity market operates as a single wholesale market across the
whole of the island of Ireland; accordingly, the Northern Irish grid is physically
connected to the Irish grid via two interconnectors. A single 275 kV double
circuit interconnector cable connects Northern Ireland with Ireland between
Tandragee (Northern Ireland) and Louth (Ireland) substations.138 Meanwhile,
two lower-capacity 110 kV cables connect at Letterkenny in Co. Donegal and
Corraclassy in Co. Cavan.139 These interconnections facilitate the functioning of
the I-SEM. Two interconnectors connect the I-SEM with the GB market.140 The
Moyle Interconnector links Northern Ireland to Scotland.141 The I-SEM is also
connected to GB via the East-West Interconnector, which connects Dublin,
Ireland to Wales.142

132
See Electricity Interconnectors, OFGEM, https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/transmission-networks/
electricity-interconnectors (last visited Feb. 19, 2020).
133
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Achieving the 10%
Electricity Interconnection Target, at 5, COM (2015) 82 final (Feb. 25, 2015).
134
Id.
135
EIRGRID GROUP, INNOVATIVE PARTNERSHIPS FOR A BRIGHTER TOMORROW 15 (2017).
136
See generally id.
137
Id. at 1.
138
Id. at 15.
139
See Transmission System 400, 275, 220 and 100kV September 2016, EIRGRID GROUP (2016),
http://www.eirgridgroup.com/site-files/library/EirGrid/EirGrid-Group-Transmission-System-Geographic-MapSept-2016.pdf.
140
See EIRGRID GROUP, supra note 6–9.
141
See Interconnection, SONI, http://www.soni.ltd.uk/customer-and-industry/interconnection/ (last
visited Feb. 19, 2020).
142
Id.
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In Northern Ireland, small scale generators (less than 5 MW) connect
exclusively to the distribution network.143 Larger generators may connect to
either distribution or transmission, but the largest generators of 110kV or above
must apply to the TSO for connection to the transmission network.144 The
application procedure varies depending upon multiple factors, including size.
Figure 7 maps out the UK’s transmission system, by the operator.
Figure 7: Transmission Network in UK145

4. Distribution System
The distribution network for the UK is managed by a far wider variety of
operators than the transmission network. For the distribution network, the GB
system is divided into eight regions. Northern Ireland is a separate region. Figure
8 offers a visualization of the current arrangements. Note that the Republic of
Ireland is included in Figure 8 below but should be ignored for this Section.

143

NIE NETWORKS, DISTRIBUTION GENERATION APPLICATION AND OFFER PROCESS STATEMENT 1 (2018).
Id.
145
Find Your Gas & Electricity Distributors, SELECTRA (Aug. 26, 2019), https://selectra.co.uk/energy/
guides/distribution.
144
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Figure 8: Distribution Network in UK146

C. Governance System
1. Energy Strategy
a. Great Britain
Britain’s energy strategy is informed by the Climate Change Act 2008, under
which the UK committed to reducing GHG emissions by 80% by 2050,
compared to 1990 levels.147 A pathway for the achievement of this target was
established by the Clean Growth Strategy (CGS), published in October 2017.148
The key policies and proposals evident in the CGS are as follows:



146

Accelerating Clean Growth;
Improving Business and Industry Efficiency;
Improving the Energy Efficiency of Homes;

Id.
DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, THE CLEAN GROWTH STRATEGY: LEADING THE WAY
TO A LOW CARBON FUTURE 5 (2017) [hereinafter THE CLEAN GROWTH STRATEGY].
148
See generally id.
147
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Accelerating the Shift to Low Carbon Transport;
Delivering Clean, Smart, Flexible Power;
Enhancing the Benefits and Value of Natural Resources;
Leading in the Public Sector; and
Government Leadership.149

Public and private investment plays a prominent role in the CGS. The
Government has allocated £2.5 billion of investment to low carbon innovation
for the period 2015–2021, with the bulk of funding targeted at the transport
sector (33%).150 The concept of cross-collaboration with business, civil society,
and the public pervades the CGS. Thus, it is made clear that the focus of the
CGS is on creating a supportive, enabling environment for investment.
On the regulatory side of the energy strategy, Ofgem has published its
blueprint, setting out a pathway for regulation in the coming years.151 It focuses
on regulatory arrangements in the following areas:






Rolling-out smart-meters and supporting the energy transition;
Balancing supply and demand;
Ensuring network capacity;
Strengthening system coordination and the institutional framework;
and
Supporting innovation.152

b. Northern Ireland
Energy policy is fully devolved to Northern Ireland. The NI Executive
published its Strategic Energy Framework (SEF) for the period 2010–2020 in
September 2010.153 The SEF provides a clear signal of the Executive’s priorities
for the energy sector. Its central aim is to create a more secure and sustainable
energy system for Northern Ireland, built around competitive markets; a secure,
efficient, and sustainable energy supply; and robust infrastructure.154
The NI Executive published its Report on the Draft Programme for
Government (PfG), containing fourteen strategic outcomes to set a clear agenda

149

See id. at 12–16.
See id. at 17.
151
OFGEM, OUR STRATEGY FOR REGULATING THE FUTURE ENERGY SYSTEM, (2017).
152
See generally id.
153
See DEP’T OF ENTERPRISE, TRADE AND INV., ENERGY: A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
IRELAND (2010).
154
See id.
150
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for the NI Executive, in December 2016.155 The draft PfG Framework includes
a number of references to energy, with a specific ambition for a secure,
sustainable, and cost-efficient energy supply.156 But with the collapse of the NI
Executive in January 2017, Northern Ireland has been thrown into flux. Clearly,
a new PfG will be necessary once power-sharing is reinstated. But given the
continued political impasse, it is unclear what progress will be made over the
coming months. Naturally, this will have serious implications for Northern
Ireland’s energy strategy, and progress thereon.
A new PfG will inevitably be influenced by the outcomes of the UK’s Brexit
negotiations. Presently, the UK is working hard to ensure that the I-SEM
continues to function unimpeded post Brexit, but this would likely result in
Northern Ireland agreeing to certain rules relating to wholesale markets while
Great Britain withdraws from them.157 This will pose further problems from a
power-sharing perspective, as the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) continues
to resist suggestions that Northern Ireland may need, in some respects, to have
different arrangements from Great Britain.158
2. Integration of Governance and Energy Strategy
In the UK, and particularly so within GB, a pro-market mentality dominates
energy discourse. While energy governance and strategy are still politicized to
the extent that it remains dictated by the government and the governmental
regulator, energy policy exists within a “pro-market” framework. The UK’s
tendency towards energy marketization was apparent in the merger of the
Department of Energy and Climate Change with the Department for Business,
Innovation and Skills to form the Department for Business, Energy and
Industrial Strategy. Northern Ireland, meanwhile, has a separate Department for
Energy, with the I-SEM regulated by a state departmental body, and operated
and managed by state-owned companies. In GB, notably, the market is regulated
by a governmental agency, but is otherwise privatized.
Energy security and climate change mitigation measures play pivotal roles
in the UK-wide energy governance sphere, as they do in the UK-wide strategic
framework for a low-carbon future. But there do appear to be inconsistencies.
155
NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY: COMM. FOR THE EXEC. OFFICE, REPORT ON THE EXECUTIVE’S DRAFT
PROGRAM FOR GOVERNMENT 2016-21, at 6 (2016).
156
Id. at 19.
157
See I-SEM Will Continue in No-Deal Brexit, ARGUS MEDIA (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.argusmedia.
com/en/news/1866067-isem-will-continue-in-nodeal-brexit.
158
See Brexit: EU and UK Reach Deal but DUP Refuses Support, BBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2019), https://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-50079385.

LEAL-ARCASETALPROOFS_3.25.20

2020]

FINANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY

5/3/2020 12:22 PM

495

The CGS promotes investment and innovation as key to the achievement of its
low carbon targets, but it is unclear the extent to which this message of an
enabling investment environment has reached, and persuaded, private investors.
Green energy investment in wind, solar, and other renewable energy sources
actually halved in the course of recent years, with a 56% decline reported in
2017.159 Mixed messages regarding the funding available for green energy
projects will tend to dissuade investment, and recent cuts to subsidies,160 along
with the commencement of the UK’s fracking program,161 will not assist the UK
in establishing the sort of coherent, predictable investment climate that tends to
attract private investment. Moreover, at the same time as the cuts to solar PV
subsidies, fossil fuel generators were receiving around £3 billion through
Capacity Market Auctions in 2017.162 The GB Capacity Market has now been
suspended, following a ruling of the European Court and pending a full
investigation by the Commission.163 It is important, however, not to misidentify
correlation as causation. The downturn in private investment could feasibly
stem, at least in part, from the increased business circumspection stemming from
the Brexit negotiations.
The aforementioned cuts to subsidies for solar panels, and a “hostile
planning approach” to new wind turbine applications have also been blamed for
a decline in domestic generation.164 Notwithstanding the foregoing, however,
some industry analysts now believe that onshore wind and solar could be viable
without subsidies by 2020, due to falling costs and advances in battery
technology.165 While there may be a number of “lost years” until the point where
these technologies are again considered viable without subsidies, it is possible

159
Adam Vaughan, UK Green Energy Investment Halves After Policy Changes, GUARDIAN (Jan. 16,
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jan/16/uk-green-energy-investment-plunges-after-policychanges.
160
James Tapper, Green Energy Feels the Heat as Subsidies go to Fossil Fuels, GUARDIAN (June 23,
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jun/23/green-energy-subsidies-community-projectsfossil-fuels.
161
Adam Vaughan, Fast-Track Fracking Plan by the Government Prompts Criticism, GUARDIAN (May
17, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/may/17/fast-track-fracking-plan-by-uk-governmentprompts-criticism.
162
Phil MacDonald, Subsidies to UK Coal Continue Despite Phase-Out Pledge, SANDBAG: SMARTER
CLIMATE POLICY (Sept. 28, 2017), https://sandbag.org.uk/2017/09/28/7807/.
163
Case T-793/14, Tempus Energy Ltd. and Tempus Energy Tech. Ltd. v. European Comm’n supported
by UK, 2013 E.C.R. 790.
164
Tapper, supra note 160.
165
Adam Vaughan, Subsidy-Free Renewable Energy Projects Set to Soar in UK, Analysts Say, GUARDIAN
(Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/mar/20/uk-subsidy-free-renewable-energy-projects-setsoar-aurora-energy-research-analysts.
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that subsequent years will see these technologies re-establish themselves on the
market.
In summary, while the UK’s central energy strategy calls for a transition to
a low-carbon energy market, the government’s tendency to appeal to the
incumbent market interests means that the implementation of its strategy can
appear to be biased towards those interests, at the possible expense of the lowcarbon transition. This being said, the UK can boast significant progress in
growing its economy while reducing its emissions. Since 1990, its emissions
have been cut by over 40%,166 while the economy has grown by two-thirds.167
In quarter 2 of 2018, almost 54% of the UK’s electricity came from low-carbon
sources.168 Based on these figures alone, the focus of UK energy strategy and
governance, on encouraging investment and innovation in an enabling market
environment, appears to be capable of delivering results. However, if these
results are to be fully realized, it will be important for the UK’s low-carbon
policy strategy to be implemented in a coherent and consistent manner.
If the UK wishes to continue to lead in green growth, it must continue to
attract investment during and after Brexit. As previously noted, it may be that
the investment downturn which has been observed in the past couple years has
been a response to the uncertainty surrounding the Brexit negotiations. But if
this is so, then the UK may need to rethink its strategy. The clearer and more
coherent its strategy is in times of uncertainty, the more confident businesses
will be in investing.
The future energy strategy of the UK will need to be informed to a large
extent by the outcomes of the Brexit process; the energy governance structure
will also need to respond to whatever new paradigm emerges. Notably, the CGS
does not make mention of Brexit.169 This is unavoidable, as the Brexit vote was
not until 2016. But this does mean that the CGS will need updating in the very
near future. One area that requires clarification is exactly how close the ties
between the UK and the EU will be after Brexit, whether it will still be part of
the EU Internal Energy Market (IEM), or whether it will withdraw. The Political
Declaration accompanying the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement fell short of
seeking continuing participation in the IEM, but did include at Clauses 66 and

166
2016 UK Provisional Greenhouse Gas Emissions, NAT’L STAT. (Mar. 30, 2017), https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/604327/2016_Provisional
_emissions_statistics_one_page_summary.pdf.
167
THE CLEAN GROWTH STRATEGY, supra note 147, at 5.
168
ENERGY TRENDS: SEPTEMBER 2018, supra note 65, at 3.
169
See generally THE CLEAN GROWTH STRATEGY, supra note 147.

LEAL-ARCASETALPROOFS_3.25.20

2020]

FINANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY

5/3/2020 12:22 PM

497

67 a high-level commitment to cooperate on the supply of energy so as to ensure
security of supply and trade over interconnectors.170 That being said, it is likely
that continued access to the IEM will play a part in the UK’s strategy, not least
because of the benefits of coordinated energy trading. However, if full
membership was politically unsatisfactory, then this would complicate matters
for Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland, of course, participates in the I-SEM with
Ireland. To the extent this must continue after Brexit, then certain EU laws
would have to continue to apply to Northern Ireland to allow for the continuation
of the I-SEM. It appears to be the UK’s wish that the I-SEM continue after
Brexit;171 for that to happen unimpeded, Northern Ireland will have to remain
part of the IEM. However, if the UK made the decision to withdraw from the
IEM, then observers may then witness a decoupling of the NI and GB markets.
It remains to be seen how politically satisfactory such a situation would be.
The UK’s departure from the EU could also have serious implications for
future climate policy. Notably, Clause 78 of the Political Declaration states:
“The future relationship should reaffirm the Parties’ commitments to
international agreements to tackle climate change, including those which
implement the United Nations Framework Conventions on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), such as the Paris Agreement.”172 The fact that the UK has bid to
hold the 2020 Conference of the Parties (COP) UNFCCC suggests that it will
strive to maintain its position as a world leader on climate change and honor its
Paris commitments. Nevertheless, it is possible that the UK could backslide on
the EU’s renewables and energy efficiency targets after Brexit. If it were to
retreat from the EU’s targets, then the implications would likely be realized only
in respect of the targets for 2030 and 2050, as the vast majority of the projects
needed to hit the 2020 renewables targets will already have been approved.
However, it is important to note that the UK has imposed on itself even more
stringent requirements for carbon emissions pursuant to its Climate Change Act
2008 (with a target to reduce GHG emissions by at least 80% of 1990 levels by
2050). The UK has met its first two budgets and is on track to meet the third;
however, the CCC cautions that more action is required to meet subsequent
budgets.173 Nevertheless, the UK has been one of the EU’s worst offenders with

170
Political Declaration Setting Out the Framework for the Future Relationship Between the European
Union and the United Kingdom, ¶¶ 66–67.
171
DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, LEAVING THE EU: NEGOTIATION PRIORITIES FOR
ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY, 2016-17, HC 909, at 19 (UK) [hereinafter LEAVING THE EU].
172
Political Declaration Setting Out the Framework for the Future Relationship Between the European
Union and the United Kingdom, ¶ 78.
173
Ten Years of the Climate Change Act, COMM. ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://www.theccc.org.uk/ourimpact/ten-years-of-the-climate-change-act/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2020).
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regard to flouting environmental laws;174 while a post-Brexit “green watchdog”
has become moot, under current plans it will not have any powers related to
climate change.175 Who will hold the UK government to account on climate
change matters following its EU departure is, therefore, unknown.
Accordingly, it is conceivable that a considerable amount of re-thinking will
be required with respect to the UK’s energy strategy in the coming months and
years. But it will only be possible to know exactly how much re-thinking or redesign will actually be necessary once the dust has settled on the Brexit
arrangements. It may be that GB chooses to withdraw from the IEM. If GB were
to withdraw but Northern Ireland were to remain, then Northern Ireland and GB
would likely become decoupled. In the event, however, that both Northern
Ireland and GB stay within the IEM—as seems probable, given the efficiency
costs of a GB exit—their energy policies would remain influenced by European
IEM developments.
With regard to Northern Ireland, while energy policy is now fully devolved
to the NI Executive, the complex interconnected nature of energy policy,
markets, systems, and infrastructure means that the UK government has always
played an important role, directly and indirectly, in shaping Northern Ireland
policy. Helpfully, the UK government recognizes the influence it has over
Northern Ireland’s energy strategy. A report by the House of Commons Northern
Ireland Affairs Committee, published in April 2017, provided a number of
examples regarding the UK’s influence.176 One example cited was the UK’s
Renewable Obligation (RO) scheme, introduced in 2002.177 The RO scheme was
withdrawn in 2011.178 It was replaced with the Contracts for Difference (CfD)
scheme, in which the subsidy varies according to the wholesale price.179
Northern Ireland was compelled to withdraw its own Renewables Obligation
scheme in response, to avoid the cost of subsidies increasing considerably.180
Another example is the Carbon Price Floor, introduced in 2013. The Carbon
Price Floor scheme introduced the obligation for industries to provide a top-up,

174
Jennifer Rankin, Activists Demand UK Environment Watchdog in Brexit Trade Deal, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/nov/26/post-brexit-trade-deal-must-guarantee-ukenvironment-watchdog-green-groups.
175
James Tapper, UK’s Green Watchdog Will Be Powerless Over Climate Change Post-Brexit, OBSERVER
(Sept. 2, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/sep/02/green-watchdog-powerless-climate-changepost-brexit.
176
NORTHERN IRELAND AFFAIRS COMM., ELECTRICITY SECTOR IN IRELAND, 2016-17, HC 51, at 6 (2017).
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
See id. at 51.
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payable if the market price for carbon fell below a certain level.181 The intention
of the scheme was to stimulate investment in low-carbon infrastructure but,
when in March 2014 the UK government announced a cap at £18 per tonne for
the period from 2016/17 to 2019/20, Northern Ireland was compelled to seek an
exemption to avoid SEM distortions.182 Despite achieving this exemption, the
Carbon Price Floor, nevertheless, had an indirect effect on Northern Ireland’s
electricity market, through reduced imports at the Moyle Interconnector.183
Given the UK’s heady influence over Northern Ireland energy strategy, it
will be important for the NI Executive and HM Government in Westminster to
continue to liaise closely in the coming months as Brexit negotiations continue.
The regulators will also need to play an important role, so collaboration between
Ofgem and UREGNI should be championed. Much will depend on the outcome
of the current negotiations, but it is feasible that Northern Ireland will seek to
gain more independence from the UK on energy policy and related matters in
the coming years—particularly if the UK’s exit from the EU puts an intolerable
strain on the functioning of the I-SEM.
D. Regulatory Framework and Energy Security
1. Regulatory Framework
a. Legislation Pertaining to the Electricity Market
The legal framework governing the electricity markets in England, Scotland,
and Wales arises from a string of regulations including, but not limited to, the
Electricity Act 1989 (as amended and supplemented); the Utilities Act 2000; the
Energy Acts 2004, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2013, and 2016; the Climate Change Act
2008; the Competition Act 1998; the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act
2013; and the Infrastructure Act 2015.184
Notably, the Energy Act 2013, which amended the Electricity Act 1989,
introduced the Electricity Market Reform (EMR).185 The EMR instigated two
key changes, the CfD scheme and the capacity market. Both will be discussed
below. In addition, the EMR also launched the emissions performance standard

181

See id. at 8–9.
See id.
183
See id. at 8.
184
Electricity Regulation: United Kingdom, GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH (Oct. 2019), https://
gettingthedealthrough.com/area/12/jurisdiction/22/electricity-regulation-2020-united-kingdom/.
185
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(EPS) and the Carbon Price Floor. The key provisions of the Energy Act 2016,
which amended the Electricity Act 1989, provide inter alia for the closure of the
RO scheme for onshore wind generators.186 The CfD scheme replaces the RO
scheme.187
The key legislation in respect of the regulatory architecture of Northern
Ireland’s electricity sector includes the Electricity (Northern Ireland) Order
1992; the Energy (Northern Ireland) Order 2003; and the Electricity (Single
Wholesale Market) (Northern Ireland) Order 2007.188
b. Regulatory Framework and the Smart Grid
i. Integration of Renewable Energy Sources
The Electricity Act 1989 (as amended and supplemented) sets out a licensing
regime which is regulated by the GEMA. A license is mandatory for the
following activities: generation; participation in transmission; distribution;
supply; participation in the operation of an electricity interconnector; and the
provision of smart metering services.189 License applicants need to submit a
written application and pay the relevant fee to the regulator, Ofgem. Certain
actors, such as small-scale generators, distributors, and suppliers, may be
exempted from holding a license insofar as they meet particular requirements.190
Licenses are subject to different types of conditions including standard
conditions (generally applicable to all licensees), amended standard conditions,
and special conditions (specific to the licensee at issue). In addition to these
requirements, licensees must observe relevant industry codes and standards,
which are usually outlined in the standard conditions of their individual
license.191
The main planning acts which relate to England are the Town and Country
Planning Act 1990; the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004; the
Planning Act 2008 and the Localism Act 2011.192 The Wales framework is
broadly similar to that of England, with the 1990 Act, 2004 Act, 2008 Act, and

186
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NORTHERN IRELAND AFFAIRS COMM., supra note 176, at 6.
188
Electricity Regulation: Ireland, supra note 184.
189
Electricity Act 1989, c. 29 (Eng.).
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Massie & Norman, supra note 130.
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LIBRARY 4 (Jan. 20, 2016), https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7459.
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2011 Act supplemented by the Planning (Wales) Act 2015.193 Pursuant to the
Electricity Act 1989, the construction or extension of an onshore generation
facility (with the exception of wind generation facilities) located in England and
Wales with a capacity exceeding 50 MW currently requires the consent from the
Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy under Section 36
of the 1989 Act (this will change come 2019—as discussed below).194 Onshore
generation facilities are usually classified as Nationally Significant
Infrastructure Projects (NSIP) under the Planning Act 2008.195 The Secretary of
State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy should sanction NSIPs
through a Development Consent Order. However, the Energy Act 2016, coupled
with the Infrastructure Planning (Onshore Wind Generating Stations) Order
2016, withdrew onshore wind farms featuring a capacity surpassing 50 MW
from the NSIP regime.196 The construction of non-wind onshore generation
facilities in England with a capacity under 50 MW, may require approval from
the relevant local planning authority in accordance with the Town and Country
Planning Act 1990.197
In Wales, most parts of the planning system are devolved. Onshore
generation facilities with a capacity ranging from 10 to 50 MW are treated as
Developments of National Significance and are decided by Welsh Ministers.198
In April 2019, the Wales Act 2017 further consented powers over energy
generating stations with a capacity of up to and including 350 MW onshore and
in Welsh waters will be devolved to Wales.199
In Scotland, development consent functions are fully devolved.200 In
Scotland, applications are considered by the Scottish Ministers for electricity
generating facilities in excess of 50 MW, or for overhead power lines and
associated infrastructure, as well as large gas and oil pipelines.201 Applications

193

Id. at 5.
Electricity Act 1989, c. 29 (Eng.).
195
Planning Act 2008, c. 29 (Eng.).
196
Specifically, the Onshore Wind Generating Stations (Exemption) (England and Wales) Order 2016
(S.I. 2016/21) as amended by the Onshore Wind Generating Stations (Exemption) (England and Wales)
(Amendment) Order 2016 (S.I. 2016/450) also removed the requirement for a Section 36 consent for onshore
wind generation.
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Massie & Norman, supra note 130.
198
Planning (Wales) Act 2015, c. 19, § 62D.
199
See Elfyn Henderson, A New Infrastructure Consenting Process For Wales, IN BRIEF: SENEDD
RESEARCH, NAT’L ASSEMBLY FOR WALES (June 7, 2018).
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See Town and County Planning (Scotland) Act 1997, as amended by the Planning etc. (Scotland) Act
2006.
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cover new projects and modifications to existing infrastructure. Below these
limits, applications are made to local authorities. Notably, applications for
marine energy are made to Marine Scotland.202
In Northern Ireland, as in Scotland, development consent functions are fully
devolved. In April 2015, a two-tier planning system came into force under the
Planning Act (Northern Ireland) 2011. Each council is now the Local Planning
Authority for its district council area. The Department of Environment (now the
Department for Infrastructure) retains authority for regionally significant
applications.
With regard to wind generation in particular, local authorities have the
ability to determine planning applications for onshore wind generation facilities
of all capacities. In England, Wales, and Scotland small-scale domestic turbines
may be considered “permitted developments” and thus not need planning
permission; however, this is subject to strict conditions. In both Scotland203 and
Wales,204 building-mounted developments require planning permission. In
England, the rules have been relaxed, building-mounted developments may be
permitted provided they comply with specific criteria.205 In Northern Ireland,
wind turbines and wind farms always require planning permission.206
Thus, the UK has a clear regulatory framework for planning applications for
renewable energy developments. Yet, planning applications for new onshore
wind developments have plummeted by 94% since the introduction of new
policies in 2015.207 These policies sought to bring the planning application closer
to local communities by allowing local authorities the final say on locations for
onshore wind development. This occurred alongside a transfer of powers from
the BEIS to the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government.
Unfortunately, no cost-benefit analysis was undertaken, and the result has been
a striking decline in applications. Around the same time, the government

202
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The Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (Domestic Microgeneration)
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2011, c. 2, § E.2.
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advice_apply/advice_renewable_energy/renewable_wind_farms.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
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withdrew its support schemes for solar; private investment has since declined
significantly on solar technologies.
With regard to connection arrangements, in both England and Wales,
generation facilities with a capacity equal or superior to 100 MW may be
connected to the transmission network; smaller facilities are directly connected
to the distribution network.208 In Scotland, smaller generation facilities may also
be directly connected to the transmission grid.209 Meanwhile, in Northern
Ireland, small scale generation facilities (less than 5 MW) connect exclusively
to the distribution network.210 Larger generators may connect to either
distribution or transmission, but the largest generators of 110kV or above must
apply to the TSO to connect to the transmission network.211 The application
procedure is dependent upon various factors, including size.
ii. Incentive Schemes (Feed-In Tariffs and Others)
In 2002, the RO scheme became effective in England, Wales, and Scotland,
whereas the RO scheme entered into effect in 2005 in Northern Ireland.212 It
required all UK electricity suppliers to generate an increasing proportion of
electricity from renewable energy sources.213 The RO scheme closed to all new
generating capacity on March 31, 2017.214 However, the closure did not affect
capacity with an accreditation date on or before the closure date.215
The Energy Act 2013 instigated the Electricity Market Reform (EMR).216
The EMR introduced the CfD scheme to promote low-carbon electricity
generation and encourage investment in electricity from renewables.217 The CfD
scheme replaced the old RO scheme.218 No decision has yet been taken by the

208
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Northern Ireland Executive regarding Northern Ireland’s participation in a UKwide CfD scheme.219
While CfDs are a useful mechanism to incentivize investment in
renewables,220 BEIS has been criticized for effectively “locking out” mature
renewable technologies such as solar and onshore wind221 from the scheme.222
The third CfD allocation round opens in May 2019, but only less-established
renewable technologies such as offshore wind, geothermal, and wave and tidal
stream will be eligible.223 The Committee on Climate Change and the National
Infrastructure Commission have been among the organizations calling for a
rethink, and the BEIS has now indicated that “further refinements” may
follow.224
The EMR also introduced the GB capacity market (“CM”).225 The CM is
covered in further detail in Section 6. Northern Ireland’s capacity market is
different from that of GB’s, Northern Ireland’s capacity market is operated by
the SEM-O as part of the I-SEM with the Republic of Ireland.226
In addition to CfDs, the UK has mobilized supplementary policies such as
the Feed-In Tariff (FIT) scheme, established in 2010, to generate electricity
based on alternative energy sources.227 Payments under the FIT scheme are made
by energy suppliers on a quarterly basis for the electricity generated and

219
DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, CONTRACTS FOR DIFFERENCE AND CAPACITY MARKET
SCHEME UPDATE 2017, 10 (2017).
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exported by eligible installations.228 The current FIT scheme notwithstanding,
some analysts suggest that solar PV and onshore wind may soon become
subsidy-free.229 The FIT scheme does not apply to Northern Ireland.230
Notably, the FIT scheme will come to an end in April 2019.231 The export
tariff, which offers a guaranteed price for all unused solar electricity, will also
end; a replacement is expected but in the interim households will in effect be
giving away surplus power.232 This decision forms a type of “double whammy”
for solar households because in the aftermath, Ofgem announced the results of
its Access and Forward-Looking Charging Review and the launch of its
Significant Code Review in which there will be considerable changes to existing
access arrangements.233 Critics of the proposals have argued that these
undermine low carbon efforts by not putting decarbonization at the center of the
review. There are now fears that the review may result in higher bills for
households generating solar energy from panels.234
Since April 2013, the Carbon Price Floor has applied as tax to fossil fuels
used for energy generation.235 Renewable electricity is exempt from paying this
tax.236 Northern Ireland secured an exemption from the Carbon Price Floor,
following concerns about the scheme’s incompatibility with the SEM (now ISEM).237

228
See Feed-in-Tariffs, OVO ENERGY, https://www.ovoenergy.com/help/feed-in-tariffs (last visited
Feb. 20, 2020).
229
Vaughan, supra note 165.
230
Georgios Maroulis, Feed-in-Tariff, RES LEGAL, http://www.res-legal.eu/search-by-country/unitedkingdom/single/s/res-e/t/promotion/aid/feed-in-tariff-5/lastp/203/ (Jan. 5, 2019).
231
About the FIT Scheme, OFGEM, https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/environmental-programmes/fit/about-fitscheme (last visited Oct. 12, 2019).
232
Adam Vaughan, Solar Households Expected to Give Away Power to Energy Firms, GUARDIAN (Dec.
18, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/dec/18/solar-power-energy-firms-government.
233
Electricity Network Access and Forward-Looking Charging Review–Significant Code Review Launch
and Wider Decision, OFGEM, https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/electricity-network-accessand-forward-looking-charging-review-significant-code-review-launch-and-wider-decision (last visited Oct. 12,
2019).
234
Adam Vaughan, Energy Shakeup Could Cut Bills by £45 a Year, GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2018, 4:47 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/money/2018/dec/18/energy-bills-ofgem-national-grid.
235
David Hirst, Carbon Price Floor (CPF) and the Price Support Mechanism, HOUSE OF COMMONS
LIBRARY 3 (Jan. 8, 2018), https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN05927.
236
RES LEGAL, RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY DATABASE AND SUPPORT—NATIONAL PROFILE: UNITED
KINGDOM 7 (2015).
237
COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE CHANGE, REDUCING EMISSIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND 30 (2019).
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iii. Heating and Cooling
The Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) is the main source for funding
renewable heat in the UK.238 The RHI supports eligible installations with a fixed
amount per kWth produced. The scheme consists of two parts—Domestic and
Non-Domestic RHI. While the Non-Domestic RHI applies to installations in
commercial, public, or industrial premises, the Domestic RHI is open to
homeowners, private landlords, social landlords, and self-builders. The
government has recently reaffirmed its commitment to the scheme, with further
reforms likely.239 Northern Ireland had a similar RHI scheme, administered by
the Department for the Economy, but this scheme was suspended to new
applicants in February 2016.240 Consultations into the future of the NonDomestic NI-RHI are ongoing,241 as is an inquiry into the operation and financial
implications of the (suspended) NI Non-Domestic RHI scheme.242
Under the Green Deal scheme,243 home and business owners could obtain a
loan for certain energy-efficiency measures specified in the Green Deal
(Qualifying Energy Improvements) Order 2012 and subsequently pay off the
loan through their energy bill. The Green Deal applied to England, Wales, and
Scotland. Originally closed in 2015 when the Government withdrew its funding,
Green Deal loans reopened in 2017 for new applications.244 It is now backed by
private investors.245 A review of the Green Deal framework is ongoing.246 Grants
are also available in Northern Ireland via the Northern Ireland Sustainable
Energy Programme.247 A further series of energy efficiency and heating grants
238
Factsheet: The Renewable Heat Incentive Domestic or Non-Domestic?, OFGEM, https://www.ofgem.
gov.uk/sites/default/files/docs/drhi_factsheet_therhidomornondom_v2_0_mar_2016_web.pdf (last visited Oct.
12, 2019).
239
DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, THE RENEWABLE HEAT INCENTIVE: A REFORMED
SCHEME, 5 (2016).
240
See Need-to-Know Guide: Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) Scheme, BBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-38307628.
241
The Future of the Northern Ireland Non-Domestic Renewable Heat Incentive Scheme, DEP’T OF THE
ECON. (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.economy-ni.gov.uk/consultations/future-northern-ireland-non-domesticrenewable-heat-incentive-scheme.
242
Renewable Heat Incentive Inquiry: Terms of Reference, DEP’T OF FIN. (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.
rhiinquiry.org/sites/rhiinquiry.org/files/media-files/rhi-inquiry-terms-of-reference.pdf.
243
Green Deal: Energy Saving for Your Home, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/green-deal-energy-savingmeasures (last visited Oct. 12, 2019).
244
See The Green Deal, WHICH?, https://www.which.co.uk/reviews/home-grants/article/home-grants/thegreen-deal (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
245
Id.
246
See generally DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, CALL FOR EVIDENCE—GREEN DEAL
FRAMEWORK.
247
Update on Northern Ireland Sustainable Energy Programme, UTIL. REGULATOR (June 4, 2018),
https://www.uregni.gov.uk/news-centre/update-northern-ireland-sustainable-energy-programme-0.
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are available via affordable heating schemes, in England and the devolved
regions.
An Enhanced Capital Allowance scheme encourages businesses to invest in
energy efficient plant and machinery.248 Businesses can set up to 100% of the
cost of assets against taxable profits in the financial year the purchase was made.
The scheme also applies in Northern Ireland.249
iv. Transport
The Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO) scheme established a
quota system for biofuels.250 This has applied since 2007.251 Under the RTFO,
fuel suppliers for transport and non-road-mobile machinery are obliged to satisfy
a specified quota number of biofuels in the total supplied fuel.252 A certification
system provides for proof of compliance.
The maximum grant now available for cars in the UK is £3,500.253 The plugin car grant was cut in early November 2018 by £1,000, while incentives of
£2,500 to buy new hybrid cars were abolished.254
In GB, there is currently a Carbon Price Floor, capped at £18 per tonne of
CO2 until 2021.255 Companies also pay for carbon credits through the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme. If, the UK falls out of the ETS post-Brexit, then
there may be an incentive to apply an additional Carbon Tax to that applied
under the ETS scheme.256

248
Energy Technology List (ETL), GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/energy-technology-list (last
updated Mar. 6, 2019).
249
See Enhanced Capital Allowances in Enterprise Zones, TAX J., https://www.taxjournal.com/articles/
enhanced-capital-allowances-enterprise-zones-20072016 (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
250
Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation, DEP’T FOR TRANSPORT (Nov. 5, 2012), https://www.gov.uk/
guidance/renewable-transport-fuels-obligation.
251
Id.
252
See id.
253
Low-Emission Vehicles Eligible for a Plug-in Grant, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/plug-in-car-vangrants (last visited Oct. 12, 2019).
254
Gwyn Topham, Scrapping UK Grants for Hybrid Cars ‘Astounding’, Says Industry, GUARDIAN
(Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/12/scrapping-uk-grants-for-hybrid-carsastounding-says-industry.
255
David Hirst, CARBON PRICE FLOOR (CPF) AND THE PRICE SUPPORT MECHANISM (2018).
256
Richard Partington, Darling and Howard Back Call for Post-Brexit Carbon Tax, GUARDIAN (Oct. 10,
2018, 7:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/oct/10/darling-and-howard-back-call-for-postbrexit-carbon-tax.
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c. Reflections on the Regulatory Framework
The UK’s regulatory framework is complex, made more so by the different
devolution arrangements among the various regions of the UK. Undoubtedly,
the UK’s ad hoc and somewhat haphazard approach to devolution will continue
to pose a challenge to the design and implementation of a coherent national
regulatory framework. The central Westminster government must therefore
continue to keep the channels of communication open with its regional
counterparts and ensure close coordination with all.
Another important consideration for the UK in the short-medium term will
be the outcome of the ongoing Brexit negotiations.257 The UK’s regulatory
framework does not seem entirely coherent. The decline in private investment
and reduction in renewable energy developments should be a major concern, as
it indicates that the lack of coherency in the regulatory framework is beginning
to impact green investment. While the Clean Growth Strategy sets out a clear
pathway to the achievement of its low-carbon transition, it is increasingly
apparent that strategy alone will not be adequate to meet the country’s targets.
In response to the growing criticism, the government commissioned a review
of its electricity market policies. The “Cost of Energy” Review was published
in October 2017, and recommended a series of changes in response to the
Review’s central findings: (1) that the cost of energy is higher than necessary to
meet the Government’s policy objectives; (2) to be consistent with the Climate
Change Act 2008; and (3) that the regulatory framework and market design is
“not fit for the purposes of the emerging low-carbon energy market …. ”258 The
recommendations include: (1) replacing current incentives (FITs and CfDs) for
low carbon generation with a single carbon price, and a unified capacity auction;
(2) the replacement of the current specific licensing scheme with a “general”
license covering distribution, supply and generation; and (3) the creation of a
National System Operator and Regional System Operator to oversee the
maintenance, development, and operation of the grid network.259 The
government has launched a call for evidence on these proposals, but the results
are pending.

257
OVERSEAS ELECTRICITY INTERCONNECTION, HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT: PARLIAMENTARY OFF. OF SCI.
& TECH, 5, n. 569 (2018).
258
Dieter Helm, COST OF ENERGY REVIEW at xi (2017).
259
See generally id.
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2. Energy Security Dimension
The UK’s energy dependency was estimated at 45.5% while the EU average
was 53.4%, as of 2014.260 Among the five EU Member States that consume the
largest amounts of energy—France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK—the
UK was the one displaying the lowest reliance on energy imports.261 Since the
early 2000s, the UK has undergone the transition of becoming a net energy
importer after many years of being a net energy exporter. This pattern has
become more acute in recent times as the UK increasingly resorts to importing
energy supplies from abroad to meet its energy needs.262
The GB system shares cross-border electricity infrastructures with NorthWest Europe and the SEM. The manufacture of new cross-border links with
Norway (NSN and NorthConnect), Denmark (Viking), Germany (NeuConnect),
Belgium (NEMO), France (GridLink, ElecLink, Aquind, IFA2, and FAB Link),
and the Republic of Ireland (Greenlink and Greenwire) is relevant.263
In addition to the Moyle Interconnector, which attaches the Northern Ireland
grid to the GB grid at Scotland, three interconnectors attach Northern Ireland to
Ireland (and thus reinforce the links between GB and Ireland). A double circuit
275kV line runs from Tandragee in Northern Ireland to Louth in Ireland.264 Two
stand-by 110kV interconnectors connect at Strabane in Tyrone County and
Enniskillenin in Fermanagh County.265 A new “North South” 400kV overhead
line is underway.266
As of 2017, the UK imported 4.2% of its electricity requirements and 36.8%
of its gas requirements.267 NGET foresees a rise in interconnectors as

260
The EU Was Dependent on Energy Imports for Slightly Over Half of its Consumption in 2014,
EUROSTAT (Feb. 4, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7150363/8-04022016-AP-EN.pdf/
c92466d9-903e-417c-ad76-4c35678113fd.
261
Id.
262
UK Energy: How Much, What Type and Where From?, OFF. FOR NAT’L STAT., (Aug. 15, 2016),
https://visual.ons.gov.uk/uk-energy-how-much-what-type-and-where-from/.
263
Jason Mann, Brexit and Electricity Interconnectors, ENERGY POL’Y RES. GROUP (May 12, 2018),
https://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/J.-Mann.pdf.
264
Cross-Border Interconnection, DEP’T FOR ECON., https://www.economy-ni.gov.uk/articles/crossborder-interconnection (last visited Oct. 10, 2019).
265
Id.
266
North South Interconnector, SYS. OPERATOR FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, http://www.soni.ltd.uk/__uuid/
2845daef-b91b-4a2e-9421-4ce38622052e/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2019).
267
Suzanna Hinson & Sara Priestley, Brexit: Energy and Climate Change, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY
11 (Sep. 5, 2019).
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intermittent renewable energy sources play an increasingly crucial role in
meeting demand.268 The same, of course, can be said of Northern Ireland.269
Interesting questions regarding the UK’s security of supply would arise in
the post-Brexit context. At present, the UK as a whole is part of the IEM, but the
GB market and the whole-of-Ireland I-SEM function as two distinct, constituent
markets. If the UK were to stay fully integrated with the IEM after Brexit it
would need to comply with the EU’s energy market rules, as well as other
relevant legislation. It would also likely need to accede to the jurisdiction of the
ECJ, as far as this extended to jurisdiction over the IEM. In the event this proves
to be politically unpalatable, then the UK may exit from the IEM.
The UK’s exit from the IEM would impact on the trade of energy through
the interconnectors, with its energy market decoupled from the EU IEM. Such a
scenario may result in tariff barriers to the cross-border supply of energy
between the UK and those participating in the IEM, although the EU does not
generally apply tariffs to imported energy from non-EU countries.270 However,
tariffs may apply to products otherwise used in the construction and maintenance
of the grid. Moreover, the UK’s ongoing interconnection projects would likely
face new obstacles, with implications for the security of its energy supply.
The UK is also concerned about the impact of Brexit on the whole-of-Ireland
I-SEM. BEIS has recommended that the I-SEM be ring-fenced,271 and a number
of options have been put forward to develop new IEM partnership models, with
the maintenance of the I-SEM at their heart.272 In the event that the I-SEM cannot
be maintained, contingency plans are being put in place to establish a separate
Northern Ireland market.273 Given however that the whole-of-Ireland I-SEM
will be fully integrated with EU markets prior to Brexit, and in light of the
potential efficiency losses for the GB market should it exit the IEM, it seems
that the risk of a whole-of-UK exit from the IEM is relatively distant. Indeed, it

268
System Operability Framework 2016, NAT’L GRID, https://www.nationalgrideso.com/sites/eso/files/
documents/8589937942-SOF%202016%20-%20Launch%20Event%20Slides%20-%20Key%20Messages%20
and%20Insights.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2019).
269
DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRAT., UPDATED ENERGY AND EMISSIONS PROJECTIONS 2017, at
35 (2018).
270
The Impact of Brexit on the EU Energy System, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 614.181) 14 (2017).
271
LEAVING THE EU, supra note 171, at 23.
272
Antony Froggatt, et al., Staying Connected: Key Elements for UK-EU27 Energy Cooperation After
Brexit, 2017 CHATHAM HOUSE: ROYAL INST. OF INT’L AFF. 3, 22–23, 50–51.
273
Dep’t for Bus., Energy & Indus. Strategy, Trading Electricity From 1 January 2021, GOV.UK,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/trading-electricity-if-theres-no-brexit-deal/trading-electricity-iftheres-no-brexit-deal (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
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is probable that the UK’s preference will be to stay in the IEM and reinforce its
energy security ties with its European neighbors.
E. Smart Metering Systems
The Smart Meter Implementation Programme (SMIP) establishes the legal
framework for the installation of smart meters, both for gas and electricity, in
every household in Great Britain by 2020. Predictions are that, by 2020,
approximately fifty million smart meters would be fitted in approximately thirty
million properties across England, Scotland, and Wales.274 Over fourteen
million smart meters have already been installed.275 According to Smart Energy
GB, a not-for-profit organization, the SMIP represented “the biggest national
infrastructure project in our lifetimes.”276
The Data Communications Company (DCC) is the entity charged with the
control of the smart metering communication system in the UK. However, a
wide variety of actors has been crucial in the promotion of smart metering
systems over the last decade. Smart GB, BEIS, Ofgem, as well as the energy
supplier’s SSE, and British Gas rank among the most enthusiastic supporters of,
and active participants in, this “smart” transition.277 After several delays, the
SMIP was officially launched in November 2016.
At the time of writing, over fourteen million smart meters have been
deployed. The UK is therefore not on course to achieve its 2020 target.
According to some, this is because of the UK’s decision to entrust the roll-out
to energy suppliers and not to the distribution system operators. The EU view
on smart grid development has been based around an unbundled utility, with the
freedom to act as a “neutral market facilitator.”278 The UK has departed from
this approach by handing control of the roll-out to the suppliers, with DSO and
regulator both having a marginal role. Given its pro-market mentality, this
decision is unsurprising; but it has proven to be a fundamental mistake. By
removing smart meters from the regulated asset base, the UK raised the capital
costs, with customers funding the difference.279 Moreover, with such a variety
274
Smart Meters Explained, SMART ENERGY GB, https://www.smartenergygb.org/en/about-smart-meters
(last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
275
Id.
276
Id.
277
Benjamin K. Sovacool et al., Vulnerability and Resistance in the United Kingdom’s Smart Meter
Transition, 109 ENERGY POL’Y 767, 772 (2018).
278
AGENCY FOR THE COOPERATION OF ENERGY REGULATORS, ENERGY REGULATION: A BRIDGE TO 2025
CONCLUSIONS PAPER 21 (2014).
279
Dieter Helm, Not So Smart–What has Gone Wrong with the Smart Meter Program and How to Fix it
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of energy suppliers participating in the UK’s market, the roll-out has become
fragmented. The handing over of control to the suppliers was also flawed insofar
as the government failed to acknowledge that suppliers were driven by profit
considerations, not grid optimization. Accordingly, their incentives actually
undermine the neutrality principle that ought to underpin the network. Thus, the
regulatory incentives and other regulatory mechanisms crucial for the
encouragement of an efficient roll-out of the program were not present in the
UK.
A novel aspect of the smart meter program in the UK, which stems from the
supplier-led roll-out, is the fact that UK smart meters always include an in-home
display (IHD), together with a data hub.280 A further distinguishing
characteristic of the UK is that it pushes separate electricity and gas smart
meters, increasing the resource burden associated with the roll-out.281 By linking
other services to the smart meter program, it was much easier for suppliers to
keep the customer locked in. Thus, despite the pro-market ideology
underpinning the roll-out, it could be argued that the UK’s program in fact
facilitated anti-competitive behaviors amongst the incumbent, and most
dominant, energy suppliers.282
The SMIP epitomizes the problems which arise when policy aims exceed
technological capabilities.283 A survey conducted by Utility Week in 2017
established that more than ten percent of residential properties have required, or
will need, multiple attempts to install their smart meters correctly.284 Reasons
for incomplete deployments include: (1) absent customers during installations;
installations taking longer than anticipated; (2) smart meters being either
inaccessible or a substantial distance apart; and (3) the challenges presented by
multiple occupancy properties. As a consequence, it is thought that the costs of
the SMIP may increase on BEIS estimates by up to one billion pounds.285 If
these estimates prove to be correct, the total costs of the SMIP would soar to
twelve billion pounds.286 In light of these difficulties, the Smart Meters Bill was
introduced in Parliament in October 2017.287
2 (Energy Futures Network Paper 23, 2017).
280
Sovacool et al., supra note 277, at 769.
281
Id. at 767.
282
Helm, supra note 279, at 4.
283
Sovacool et al, supra note 277 at 772.
284
Id. at 773.
285
Press Release, The Big Deal, Smart Meter Rollout Could Cost £1 Billion More Than Predicted, BIG
DEAL (Feb. 2, 2017), https://blog.thebigdeal.com/total-cost-smart-meter-rollout-massive-12-billion/.
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Id.
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LEAL-ARCASETALPROOFS_3.25.20

2020]

FINANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY

5/3/2020 12:22 PM

513

The roll-out in the UK has been ambitious, but the implementation of the
SMIP has not achieved the expected results. Technical challenges have led to a
retreat from its initial targets. Meanwhile, the decision to put the roll-out in the
hands of the incumbent energy suppliers made the mistake of obeying the logic
of the existing system. As a result, the SMIP has not adequately engaged with
the customer: it boasts of empowerment, without communicating how this
empowerment results in gains to the customer. The lack of engagement has
resulted in resistance and apathy towards smart meters; unfortunately, tackling
this social dimension has not been at the forefront of the SMIP.288 Vulnerability
(poverty and age), concerns about cyber security and privacy, and the possible
health effects of the technology have all been identified as translating into
resistance towards the SMIP.289 Accordingly, understanding what it is that
consumers want, and tailoring the program to meet this, should be a core focus
of the SMIP over the coming months and years.
Given the persistent apathy and even resistance towards the roll-out, it is
important that control of the SMIP be given to distribution. This has worked
elsewhere, such as in Ireland. As the focus of distribution is on the optimization
of the network, it is in a far better position than the incumbent market suppliers
to implement a roll-out that places customers at its heart. The legislative hurdles
to this would be significant, but if there was a consensus on putting the
distributors in charge, then it would be possible to put the necessary contractual
arrangements in place. Once in the hands of the distributors, the program could
be made a condition of supply. This would remove the social hurdles currently
experienced by the SMIP. In addition to rethinking the governance of the
program, Ofgem and BEIS should consider carefully how to design smart meters
in a way that responds to the social dimension of the roll-out. In particular, the
regulator and government should seek to understand the reasons behind the
rejection rate for smart meters and should consult on how best to encourage
behavioral change and reductions in energy consumption through the SMIP.
Note that in Northern Ireland, the Department for the Economy has no
intention of installing smart meters at present.290 Presumably, any program
would be informed by smart meters in both GB and Ireland.

ANSWERS 4 (2017).
288
Sovacool et al., supra note 277, at 774.
289
Id.
290
Meter Replacement Programme, NORTHERN IRELAND ELECTRICITY NETWORKS, https://www.
nienetworks.co.uk/meterupdate (last visited Oct. 18, 2019).
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F. Demand Response
1. Great Britain
Harnessing grid flexibility is seen as a central pillar of the transition to a
smarter, more efficient, and more stable electricity grid. Non-synchronous
energy sources will put the existing grid under increasing pressure, unless these
can be harnessed through a more flexible, responsive network. Innovative
demand side response (DSR) technologies can help to balance non-synchronous
generation with demand and can therefore provide essential services to the grid.
Accordingly, DSR technologies play a key role in GB’s energy strategy.
The market framework for DSR technologies is underpinned by a series of
publications. Among them is a 2017 Report to the Committee on Climate
Change, which included the “Roadmap for Flexibility Services to 2030.”291
BEIS subsequently published its response to its own consultation on a Smart
Flexible Energy System. This paper was titled “Upgrading Our Energy System:
A Smart Systems and Flexibility Plan,” and was published in partnership with
Ofgem.292 A progress update was published in late 2018, with grid flexibility
continuing to be seen as a central plank of the low-carbon transition.293 The
significance of the 2017 Plan is underscored by both the Clean Growth Strategy
of October 2017294 and the Industrial Strategy of November 2017,295 within
which it features prominently. The government’s commitment to the 2017 Plan
is demonstrated by its decision to back the framework with £265 million of
public funds. These funds will be directed towards incentivizing storage
innovations, as well as accelerating demand response technologies.296
In 2018, Utility Week, in association with CGI, published the results of its
research into DSR in a paper entitled Embracing Flexibility: Transforming the
Power System by 2030.297 It identified that the most significant barriers to
demand side flexibility remains the lack of a commercial or market framework
291
PÖYRY, ROADMAP FOR FLEXIBILITY SERVICES TO 2030: A REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE
CHANGE 3 (2017).
292
HM GOV. & OFGEM, UPGRADING OUR ENERGY SYSTEM: SMART SYSTEMS AND FLEXIBILITY PLAN 1, 3
(2017) [hereinafter UPGRADING OUR ENERGY SYSTEM].
293
HM GOV. & OFGEM, UPGRADING OUR ENERGY SYSTEM: SMART SYSTEMS AND FLEXIBILITY PLAN:
PROGRESS UPDATE 3 (2018).
294
HM GOV., THE CLEAN GROWTH STRATEGY: LEADING THE WAY TO A LOW CARBON FUTURE 45 (2017).
295
HM GOV., INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY: BUILDING A BRITAIN FIT FOR THE FUTURE 45 (2017).
296
Funding for Innovative Smart Energy Systems, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/funding-forinnovative-smart-energy-systems (last update June 20, 2019).
297
UTILITY WEEK & CGI, EMBRACING FLEXIBILITY: TRANSFORMING THE POWER SYSTEM BY 2030, 17–
19 (2018).
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(identified by 7.1/10), closely followed by the inability to stack value (at
6.9/10).298 Customer side barriers (identified by 46.9%) are also seen as a
significant barrier to demand side flexibility projects, only just behind the
economic barriers (50%).299 These customer side barriers are predominated by
low levels of customer awareness (identified by 86.7%), which are slowing
down the adoption of flexible, low carbon technologies and the realization of the
benefits.300 In light of this, Utility Week has identified that the following
refinements need to be made to GB’s demand response framework: (1) raising
consumers’ awareness of the benefits arising from low carbon and connected
home tech; (2) identifying the technical challenges for projects, including those
relating to electric vehicles; and (3) delivering a robust market framework. These
findings are supported by the Demand Side Response: Aligning Risk and
Reward 2018 Report produced by The Energyst in partnership with National
Grid, among others.301
a. Demand Response Market Players
Currently, DSR providers can deliver services by either reducing their
demand or taking advantage of onsite generation. Large industrial and
commercial customers, small to medium enterprises, or aggregators can
participate.302 The integration of independent aggregators into the market is seen
as crucial step in the delivery of system flexibility. Ofgem has been a leader in
driving the necessary changes to market infrastructure.303
Residential DSR is crucial for achieving electricity system flexibility.
However, the DSR market remains closed to the domestic prosumer. Time of
Use tariffs could help to drive changes to domestic consumer behavior, opening
up the residential market to demand response schemes. Eliminating constraints
to uptake and response should be a key UK strategy moving forward, whether
that be through financial incentive schemes, or information-only schemes which
rely on information campaigns and technologies to encourage behavioral pattern
changes. UK Power Networks ToU tariff trial appears to have demonstrated that
domestic consumers would be willing participants in the market; deploying such
298

Id. at 5.
Id.
300
Id.
301
THE ENERGYST, DEMAND SIDE RESPONSE: ALIGNING RISK AND REWARD: 2018 REPORT, (2018).
302
NATIONAL GRID ESO, Demand Side Response (DSR), https://www.nationalgrideso.com/balancingservices/demand-side-response-dsr (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
303
Independent Aggregators and Access to the Energy Market–Ofgem’s View, OFGEM, https://www.
ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/independent-aggregators-and-access-energy-market-ofgem-s-view
(last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
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tariffs on a wider scale could therefore help to engage the residential market in
demand response technologies.304
b. Balancing Services
National Grid offers a number of DSR schemes.305 Only some of the
available schemes are outlined below, for brevity.
i. Balancing Mechanism
The Balancing Mechanism helps National Grid to balance supply and
demand in close to real time, in each half hourly trading period of every day.306
During this time National Grid can instruct parties to increase or decrease their
generation or consumption. All wholesale market participants will register with
the Balancing Mechanism.
National Grid is looking into the reform options of the Balancing
Mechanism, with a view to extending access and removing barriers to entry to
the mechanism.
ii. Reserve Services/ Frequency Response
Short Term Operating Reserve (STOR) is a reserve service for the provision
of extra power or reduction in demand in terms of grid stress.307 It is a contracted
balancing service, whereby the service provider delivers a contracted level of
power on request. A minimum capacity threshold of 3 MW of generation or
demand reduction applies. Sites below 3 MW may participate via an Aggregator.
Other reserve schemes include Fast Reserve and Demand Turn Up.308
Firm Frequency Response (FFR) provides either a dynamic or non-dynamic
response to changes in frequency.309 There are three response speeds: (1) within
10 seconds of an event, sustained for 20 seconds; (2) within 30 seconds of event,

304

UK POWER NETWORKS, RESIDENTIAL DEMAND SIDE RESPONSE FOR OUTAGE MANAGEMENT AND AS

AN ALTERNATIVE TO NETWORK REINFORCEMENT 2 (2014).
305
Balancing Services, NATIONAL GRID ESO, https://www.nationalgrideso.com/balancing-services (last
visited Feb. 24, 2020).
306
NATIONAL GRID, WIDER ACCESS TO THE BALANCING MECHANISM ROADMAP 8 (2018).
307
Short Term Operating Reserve (STOR), NATIONAL GRID ESO, https://www.nationalgrideso.com/
balancing-services/reserve-services/short-term-operating-reserve-stor?overview (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
308
Reserve Services, NATIONAL GRID ESO, https://www.nationalgrideso.com/balancing-services/reserveservices (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
309
Firm Frequency Response (FFR), NATIONAL GRID ESO, https://www.nationalgrideso.com/balancingservices/frequency-response-services/firm-frequency-response-ffr?overview (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
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sustained for further 30 minutes; and (3) within 10 seconds of an event, sustained
indefinitely.310 A minimum capacity threshold of 1 MW response energy
applies. FFR was one of the most valuable services on a £/MWh basis, however
the margins have been eroded.
iii. Capacity Market311
The Capacity Market (CM) was established as part of the reform package
introduced under the Energy Act 2013. The CM seeks to guarantee the
uninterrupted supply of electricity.312 The CM remunerates demand side
response providers for lowering demand at times of peak demand.313 The CM is
delivered and implemented by National Grid.
Auctions are organized either one (T-1 Auctions) or four (T-4 Auctions)
years ahead of the year in which capacity must be supplied. The third main CM
auction was successfully concluded in the 2016 T-4 Auction (for delivery in
2020–2021).314 Around 70GW of capacity entered the process, with 75% of
capacity (52.4 GW) securing capacity agreements at a total forecast cost of
£1.18b (in 2016 prices).315 A supplementary auction followed in February 2017,
with 54.4GW of capacity secured.316 Preceding full entry into the CM in 2018–
2019, DSR was offered targeted support by way of two Transitional
Arrangements Auctions, the second of which secured 312MW of capacity.317
DSR providers may now deliver their services via the CM. However, despite
its claim of technology neutrality, there are considerable barriers to DSR’s
effective participation in the CM. In order to participate in the CM, DSR must
have a (proven or unproven) capacity of not less than 2MW, according to the
Capacity Market Rules.318 Moreover, the capacity agreements vary significantly
in length. While electricity generators can bid for contracts between three and
fifteen years, all other capacity providers including DSR can only acquire a one310

Id.
The following section is accurate as of the time of writing, December 2018. The Capacity Market
restarted in October of 2019.
312
OFGEM, Capacity Market (CM) Rules, https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/wholesale-market/
market-efficiency-review-and-reform/electricity-market-reform/capacity-market-cm-rules (last visited Oct. 18,
2019).
313
Massie & Norman, supra note 130.
314
Id.
315
DEP. FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, CONTRACTS FOR DIFFERENCE AND CAPACITY MARKET
SCHEME UPDATE 4 (2017).
316
Id.
317
Id.
318
See generally ELECTRICITY: THE CAPACITY MARKET RULES 2014.
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year contract.319 DSR must also provide a capital bond (a “bid bond”) when
bidding for one-year contracts.320 This means that DSR is placed at a
considerable disadvantage when competing on the CM. DSR providers are also
troubled by the government’s decision to reduce T-1 auction volume, out of
concerns that the smaller volume may mean that DSR providers can easily be
outbid by a larger power station.321 Another worrying development has been the
recent suggestion, by the utility Scottish Power, that DSR which uses behindthe-meter batteries will be subject to the same deratings as standalone batteries
treated as generating assets. This proposal has been described as “misguided”
by DSR experts, not least because it fails to recognize the flexibility inherent in
turn-down DSR, and its different characteristics and capabilities.322
Notably, the CM in the UK has been temporarily suspended following the
recent European Court decision that the Commission failed to adequately
investigate the plan for the CM prior to formally approving it.323 In particular,
the court concluded that the Commission did not analyze whether the difference
in treatment between DSR and generators was appropriate.324 It is likely that
some form of market redesign will now be necessary. Given the barriers that
DSR faces when participating in the market, it is clear that there is scope to
intelligently update the model. Removing the capital bond and extending the
length of contracts available are two examples of possible improvements. The
government is aware of the need to refine the market, but at present it continues
to be driven by logic of the incumbent, large generation facilities. Until this
underlying bias is removed, the capacity market will likely continue to fall short
with regard to DSR.
Finally, and aside from the DSR issues, there have been long-standing calls
to open up the CM to renewables—the government has now identified this as a
high priority strategic goal.325 Renewables have to date been largely precluded
319
See Capacity Market Standstill: The Perfect Time to Move Forwards, SMARTESTENERGY (July 2,
2019), https://smartestenergy.com/info-hub/blog/capacity-market-standstill-the-perfect-time-to-move-forwards/.
320
See ELECTRICITY: THE CAPACITY MARKET RULES 2014, supra note 318, at 51 (defining “Applicant
Credit Cover”).
321
HOUSE OF COMMONS: ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE COMMITTEE, THE ENERGY REVOLUTION AND
FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR UK ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: THIRD REPORT OF SESSION 2016–17, at
17 [hereinafter THE ENERGY REVOLUTION].
322
B. Coyne, Should Ofgem Consider Derating DSR Plus Battery Storage? Aggregators Weigh In,
ENERGYST (Mar. 23, 2018), https://theenergyst.com/ofgem-right-consider-derating-capacity-market-dsr-aggregatorsweigh/.
323
Case T-793/14, Tempus Energy Ltd. v. European Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2018:790, ¶ 37.
324
Id.
325
HM GOV., DELIVERING CLEAN GROWTH: PROGRESS AGAINST MEETING OUR CARBON BUDGETS–THE
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE CHANGE 23 (2018).
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from bidding in the auction, as they are almost entirely supported by subsidies.
However, with solar and onshore wind likely to be viable without subsidies in
the near future, it is possible that a raft of new projects could soon be eligible to
enter the CM. The government is examining how renewables could be integrated
in the future and is currently consulting with stakeholders on a possible redesign
of the CM mechanism.
2. Northern Ireland
DSR is managed through the whole-of-island I-SEM. Accordingly, it is a
joint undertaking regulated by the CRU and UREGNI, with the TSOs and DSOs
also engaged in the establishment of a viable market framework.
a. Demand Response Market Players
Consumers can participate in demand side response through tariff-based
schemes, including Economy 7 (Northern Ireland). In addition to individual
demand side participation, medium to large users can participate in a Demand
Side Unit (DSU) or Aggregated Generating Unit (AGU).326 A DSU consists of
one or more individual demand sites, which can reduce their demand as
requested by the TSO (SONI in Northern Ireland, EirGrid in Ireland). A DSU
can contract with other DSUs, and aggregate these to form a single, aggregated
unit.
As with the UK, the domestic prosumer is currently precluded from entry
into the demand side market. However, the I-SEM is working towards the
integration of domestic customers into future demand response services. The
DSOs are investing in the grid to ensure that projected capacity—in particular
that arising from the smart meter roll-out—is realized.327
b. Capacity Market
A single capacity market operates across the whole of the island of Ireland.
Generators are encouraged to participate in the Irish CM through a mechanism
called the Capacity Remuneration Mechanism.328 These payments are made
available through a competitive auction process under the I-SEM.
326
Demand Side Management (DSM), EIRGRID GROUP, http://www.eirgridgroup.com/customer-andindustry/becoming-a-customer/demand-side-management/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
327
Flexibility on Our Networks, ESB NETWORKS, https://www.esbnetworks.ie/who-we-are/innovation/
our-innovation-strategy/flexibility-on-our-networks (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
328
Capacity Remuneration Mechanism, UTILITY REGULATOR, https://www.uregni.gov.uk/capacityremuneration-mechanism-0 (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
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The capacity auction market is now fully functional, although teething issues
have been identified. DSUs are able to participate in the capacity auction market
as generators. However, it has been revealed that DSUs with a limited duration
for demand reduction (of less than or equal to 6 hours) will now receive the same
de-rating factors applied to energy storage, despite the fact that demand response
and storage are completely different technologies.329 This change will apply
from capacity year 2019–2020. Critics argue that this will discourage demand
side response providers from participating within I-SEM and the Irish CM by
reducing the available revenues.
The CRM has received State Aid clearance from the European
Commission.330 However, the changes relating to DSUs may leave the CRM
open to the accusation that demand-side response technologies are being
hampered from participating effectively alongside generation. This is
particularly pertinent given the recent ruling of the General Court of the
European Union, which has resulted in the temporary suspension of the UK
market.331
3. Reflections on Demand Response
There are still formidable barriers to DSR in the UK and Northern Ireland,
with revenue and policy uncertainty posing significant obstacles to prospective
participants. Improving business knowledge and understanding about the
various DSR schemes will be key. To this end, National Grid’s System Needs
and Product Strategy (SNAPS) publication, which sought feedback on how to
simplify current balancing schemes, was a welcome development in the UK
space. Since then, National Grid has produced three roadmaps: (1) Product
Roadmap for Frequency Response and Reserve; (2) Product Roadmap for
Restoration; and (3) Product Roadmap for Reactive Power, with a series of
deliverables which set out to encourage more widespread participation in the
balancing services market.332 However, the complexities of the market mean that
a straightforward, independent industry guide to DSR is well overdue.
Collaboration by National Grid with the market incumbents (suppliers,
329
David Pratt, Demand Response Facing De-Rating in Irish Capacity Market, CURRENT (June 8, 2019),
https://www.current-news.co.uk/news/demand-response-facing-de-rating-in-irish-capacity-market##target
Text=David%20Pratt&targetText=Demand%20side%20response%20in%20the,the%20country’s%20electricit
y%20market%20authority.
330
See State Aid: Commission Approves Joint Capacity Mechanism for Ireland and Northern Ireland,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Nov. 24, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_4944.
331
Case T-793/14, Tempus Energy Ltd. v. European Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2018:790, ¶ 37.
332
See Future of Balancing Services, NATIONAL GRID ESO, https://www.nationalgrideso.com/
publications/future-balancing-services (last visited Mar. 2, 2020).
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aggregators) on such a project could therefore be most advantageous.
G. Data Protection
The Data Protection Act 1998 articulates the basic legal framework in the
UK.333 Despite the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU, Regulation (EU)
679/2016, also known as General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), will still
be applicable to the UK while it remains a part of the EU.334 Meanwhile,
companies doing business with the EU post-Brexit will need to comply with the
GDPR due to its extraterritorial reach. The Data Protection Act 2018
complements the GDPR and is now fully in force.335
The national data protection authority is the Information Commissioner’s
Officer (ICO).336 The ICO promotes transparency in public entities and
safeguards data privacy for citizens.337 To this end, it provides guidance to both
citizens and organizations and enforces compliance with relevant regulations.
Where consumption data comes with information that could be used to
determine the identity of, and limited information about, a consumer, that
consumption data is treated as personal data.338 Accordingly, the access of
parties to information of this nature is subjected to compliance with the
applicable legislative instruments. More concretely, those wishing to access this
electricity data must observe the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998—
in respect of treatment of personal data. As well the Privacy and Electronic
Communications Regulations 2003—with regard to the privacy of consumers
using communication network or services. Further, the electricity distribution
license delineates in its Condition 10A (SLC10A) the terms and requirements
under which DSOs can obtain, access and use consumption data provided by
smart metering systems.339 Pursuant to 10A.2, licensees must not, subject to
certain conditions, obtain consumption data relating to a period of less than one
month.340 There are also restrictions on the use of data. DSOs must submit “data
333

The Data Protection Act 1998, c. 29 (UK).
Council Regulation 2016/679, O.J. (L 119) 1.
335
Data Protection Act 2018, c. 12 (U.K.).
336
Guide to Data Protection, ICO, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/ (last
visited Mar. 2, 2020).
337
Id.
338
OFGEM, ACCESS TO HALF-HOURLY ELECTRICITY DATA FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES 13–14 (2018)
[hereinafter ACCESS TO HALF-HOURLY ELECTRICITY DATA].
339
GAS AND ELECTRICITY MKTS. AUTHORITY, STANDARD CONDITIONS OF THE ELECTRICITY
DISTRIBUTION LICENCE 53 (Aug. 25, 2017), https://epr.ofgem.gov.uk/Content/Documents/Electricity%20
Distribution%20Consolidated%20Standard%20Licence%20Conditions%20-%20Current%20Version.pdf.
340
Id.
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privacy plans” to the national regulator, Ofgem. In these plans, the network
operators clarify the manner in which the consumption data will be anonymized,
to ensure that the processed data cannot be used to identify a particular
household.341
In 2012, the government conducted research into the public’s attitude
towards data and privacy in relation to smart metering. The result was the Smart
Metering Data Access and Privacy: Public Attitudes Research document,
published in December 2012.342 A particular concern was the perceived
intrusiveness of frequent meter readings, and some respondents were suspicious
about the level of detail collected. Reservations about data protection persisted.
Certain security risks were also identified: in particular, the fact that more
detailed data could be used, theoretically, to identify a consumer’s absence from
their home.343
The Data Access and Privacy Framework (DAPF) for smart meters regulates
the use of customer’s energy consumption data stemming from smart meters.344
This Framework determines the access by market participants to energy
consumption data. The precise granularity of the data that can be accessed is
dependent on whether the consumer has decided to opt in or out of the program.
The DAPF issues the following basic instructions to energy suppliers:
By default, energy suppliers can access monthly and daily consumption data
in the interest of billing and accounting.
Provided the supplier has the customer’s consent, or the customer has not
opted out, energy suppliers can access consumption data more detailed than
monthly, but not more detailed than daily.
If the customer decides to opt in, energy suppliers can access more detailed
data, down to half-hourly data.345
Energy network operators can only access data relating to periods of less
than one month if they have obtained the consumer’s consent to do so or have

341
OFGEM, Smart Meters: Distribution Network Operators Privacy Plans, https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/
electricity/retail-market/metering/transition-smart-meters/smart-meters-distribution-network-operatorsprivacy-plans (last visited Nov. 3, 2019).
342
See DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE, SMART METERING: DATA ACCESS AND PRIVACY
(2012).
343
See id. at 14–17.
344
See generally Dept. for Bus., Energy & Indus. Strategy, Smart Metering Implementation Programme
(2018).
345
Id.
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implemented Ofgem-approved procedures relating to the anonymization of that
data. No restrictions are imposed on the network operator or supplier regarding
access to other (non-consumption) data, provided that access complies with
existing data legislation.346 Rules apply to third party access to consumption
data.
The existing framework has been supplemented by the Smart Meters Act
2018 (which extends to England, Wales, and Scotland only).347 The SMA 2018
has granted Ofgem additional powers to implement market-wide Half-Hourly
(HH) Settlement Data for domestic and smaller non-domestic customers.348 As
part of its review into the settlement arrangements for HH data, Ofgem is
considering three options: (1) an “Opt-In” program, where access is subject to
existing rules; (2) an “Opt-Out” program, where there is a legal obligation on
the responsible settlement party to process HH data unless the consumer optsout; or (3) a “Mandatory” option.349 Two additional enhanced privacy options
are also being considered: (1) anonymization of data post-settlement; and (2) a
“hidden identity” option which would entail the “pseudonymization” of data
through the use of a unique identifier which obscures the consumer’s “real
world” identity.350 Ofgem is currently consulting on the issue, although
responses have now closed.351
Privacy concerns continue to be one of the major hurdles to the public uptake
of smart metering technology: assuaging these concerns is therefore one of the
main challenges for those supporting the roll-out. The UK’s regulatory
framework has been bolstered by the GDPR, but the data management model
that will emerge post-Brexit remains an unknown. While it is likely that the
UK’s post-Brexit data management model will take its lead from the provisions
of the GDPR, not least because the unravelling of the data privacy framework
would be of huge, and vocal, public interest, the UK’s pro-market tendencies
loom large on the agenda. To date, it has placed the responsibility for the smart
metering roll-out securely in the hands of the suppliers. It must therefore ensure
that whatever data management model it ends up with establishes an appropriate
balance between these commercial interests and the public’s data privacy
concerns.

346
347
348
349
350
351

Id. at 9–10.
See Smart Meters Act 2018, c. 14 (UK).
See id.
ACCESS TO HALF-HOURLY ELECTRICITY DATA, supra note 338, at 5.
See id. at 28–37.
ACCESS TO HALF-HOURLY ELECTRICITY DATA, supra note 338, at 13–14.
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H. Electric Vehicles and Energy Storage
1. Electric Vehicles
Pursuant to the Climate Change Act 2008, the UK has set itself the objective
to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050, with Electric Vehicles forming
a key part of the UK’s strategy.352 The UK government has taken a number of
steps with respect to the promotion of EVs, including the establishment of the
Office for Low Emissions Vehicles (OLEV).353 It has also promoted the
discontinuation of petrol and diesel cars in the UK from 2040 onwards.354
EVs feature prominently in BEIS’s Industrial Strategy. The government has
established a £30 million fund to promote Vehicles-to-Grid technologies, with
the aim of delivering a design and development model which illustrates how the
electricity system could, at peak hours, benefit from the power stored in EVs.355
Infrastructure is viewed as one of the main obstacles to the uptake of EVs.
The Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 endeavors to address this gap by
giving the government new powers to require charging points be built at all
motorway service stations and “large fuel retailers.”356 The Act builds on the
Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Regulations 2017, including powers to create a
uniform method of accessing charging points, and establish reliability
standards.357 Notably, the part of the Act dealing with charging infrastructure
applies to the whole of the UK.
The powers under the 2018 Act have been matched by the creation of the
new Charging Infrastructure Investment Fund, in July 2018.358 The CIIF is a
£400 million fund, of which £200 million is government funding; the private
sector will put forward the remaining £200 million.359
The government will also support infrastructure development by way of
352

HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT: OFF. OF SCI. & TECH., ELECTRIC VEHICLES: POSTNOTE No. 265, 2010 (U.K.).
Office for Low Emission Vehicles, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/officefor-low-emission-vehicles (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
354
ENERGY UK, THE ELECTRIC VEHICLE REVOLUTION: A REPORT FROM ENERGY UK 4 (2017).
355
£30 Million Investment in Revolutionary V2G Technologies, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/
government/news/30-million-investment-in-revolutionary-v2g-technologies. (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
356
Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018, c. 18 (UK).
357
See The Alternative Fuels Infastructure Regulations 2017, No. 897 (UK).
358
See Charging Infastructure Investment Fund, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/charging-infrastructure-investment-fund (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
359
Details of the Operation of the Charging Infastructure Investment Fund, GOV.UK (Sept. 2019),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/834758/Deta
ils_of_the_operation_of_the_CIIF.pdf.
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grant schemes. The Electric Vehicle Homecharge Scheme360 is continuing and
the Workplace Charging Scheme grant has been increased from a maximum of
£300 to a maximum of £500 per socket.361 A second round of funding for local
authorities to roll out low emission taxi charge point infrastructure is also
planned, with £6 million available.362
As noted in Section iv above, the maximum grant now available for UK
purchasers of EVs is £3,500.363 The plug-in car grant was cut in early November
2018 by £1,000, while the grant worth £2,500 to buy new hybrid cars was
abolished altogether.364 The decision to cut the available incentives has been
described as “astounding.”365 While it is positive that some incentives remain in
place, the decision does risk undermining progress on the low-emission and EV
sectors.
Taxation is an area which has not garnered much focus from the government
to date. The 2018 National Infrastructure Assessment recognizes that there may
be a need for the government to consider a road pricing scheme, particular as
revenue from fuel duty/vehicle excise duty decreases.366 In addition to protecting
tax revenue, an adequate pricing scheme would also help to finance road
infrastructure development. However, despite the 2018 NIA’s recommendation,
the government has not moved any moves to bring this to the forefront of its EV
policy.
Finally, the Electric Vehicle Energy Taskforce has been launched to help to
bring energy and transport sectors together to plan for EV uptake, and to ensure
that the electricity system can meet future demand.367 The creation of the EVET
signals the collaborative approach which underlies the UK’s efforts to drive
progress in the low emission transport sector. With regard to the most critical

360
See generally OFF. FOR LOW EMISSION VEHICLES, CUSTOMER GUIDANCE: ELECTRIC VEHICLE
HOMECHARGE SCHEME (2019),
361
See OFF. FOR LOW EMISSION VEHICLES, WORKPLACE CHARGING SCHEME GUIDANCE FOR APPLICANTS,
INSTALLERS AND MANUFACTURERS 2 (2019).
362
See OFFICE FOR LOW EMISSION VEHICLES, ULTRA LOW EMISSION TAXI INFRASTRUCTURE SCHEME:
WINNERS, (2018).
363
Low-Emission Vehicles Eligible for a Plug-in Grant, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/plug-in-car-vangrants (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
364
Gwyn Topham, Scrapping UK Grants for Hybrid Cars ‘Astounding’, Says Industry, GUARDIAN, 12
Oct. 12, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/12/scrapping-uk-grants-for-hybrid-carsastounding-says-industry (last visited Nov. 3, 2019).
365
Id.
366
See generally NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COMMISSION, NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE ASSESSMENT
(2018).
367
See ENERGY TASKFORCE, ENERGISING OUR ELECTRIC VEHICLE TRANSITION.
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players, the National Infrastructure Committee envisages a key role for Ofgem
in terms of regulating electric vehicles.368 EVs also feature strongly in each of
National Grid’s latest Future Energy Scenarios. National Grid now predicts that
there could be as many as 11 million EVs by 2030 and 36 million by 2050.369
However, National Grid anticipates that smart charging technologies, consumer
behavior changes (charging at off-peak times) and V2G technology should mean
that the increase in peak electricity demand could be as little as 8GW in 2040.370
Making this a reality will require close collaboration with all key stakeholders,
including industry and research and development. However, the establishment
of the EVET indicates that the UK is on the right track.
2. Energy Storage
BNEF forecasts that the global energy market is set to double six times by
2030, with the UK projected to play a key role in global growth.371 Aurora
Energy Research has found that storage must play a key part in the UK’s energy
strategy, with 13GW of additional distributed and flexible generation assets
needed by 2030 to balance the UK’s electricity grid as more renewable projects
come online.372 Battery storage is thought to be likely to grow fifty times
compared to 2017 levels by the end of 2022.373 Opportunities for storage assets
will be driven forward by falling technology costs, as will the emergence of new
revenue streams through the balancing, ancillary services and capacity markets.
Storage technologies feature prominently in the UK’s nationwide energy
strategy. Storage was a key consideration in the National Grid’s System Needs
and Product Strategy (SNaPS), published on June 13, 2017.374 Meanwhile,
Ofgem has published a response to its “A Smart, Flexible Energy System: Call
for Evidence” consultation. This response includes the Smart Systems and

368
See Ofgem Proposals a Good First Step to Preparing the UK for More Electric Vehicles, NATIONAL
INFASTRUCTURE COMMISSION (July 23, 2018), https://www.nic.org.uk/news/ofgem-proposals-a-good-first-stepto-preparing-the-uk-for-more-electric-vehicles/.
369
NATIONAL GRID, FUTURE ENERGY SCENARIOS: SYSTEM OPERATOR 3 (2018).
370
Id.
371
Michael Holder, BNEF: Global Energy Storage Market to Double Six Times by 2030, BUSINESSGREEN,
(Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/3021679/bnef-global-energy-storage-market-todouble-six-times-by-2030.
372
Aurora: Smart Grids and Storage Present £6bn Opportunity, BUSINESSGREEN (Oct. 12, 2018),
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Flexibility Plan which sets out the proposed approach for integrating flexible
and smart technologies into the evolving UK energy system.375
The auction cleared at £6/kW per year. Meanwhile, GE has announced that
its largest grid-scale battery storage system project (41MW) to date will be
located in the UK.376 A giant 50MW battery storage facility is also planned. The
facility will utilize technology provided by SMA Sunbelt Energy, a fully owned
subsidiary of German energy storage specialist SMA Solar Technology AG.377
Flexible services provider Battery Energy Storage Solutions (BESS) has also
just raised more than $100 million in U.S. dollars in investment to target UK
projects totaling 100MW.378 In the residential market, Nissan announced in
January 2018 that it will be providing a system of solar panels and batteries to
UK homes, stating that customers could save up to 66% on energy bills through
their service.379 Further, UK-based energy storage and smart home firm Moixa
has recently launched a new 4.8kWh battery storage device for domestic use,
with an output of 1000W.380
Thus, the energy storage market has demonstrated its potential for significant
growth in the coming years. The commitment of the regulator and TSO, together
with infrastructural and regulatory developments showing both private and
public commitment to increasing the role of storage on the UK electricity grid,
have reinforced the role of storage in the UK’s transition strategy.
Nevertheless, there are gaps in the framework. These include those identified
by Ofgem, and it is heartening that the regulator is leading the charge in creating
a more robust, friendly market framework. An area that requires particular
attention in the UK, as elsewhere, is the lack of a regulatory definition for the
concept of energy storage. Article 2, paragraph 2, point (d) (i) of The Electricity
(Class Exemptions from the Requirement of a License) Order 2001, which
confirms that the operator of “equipment” which “is generating or is capable of
375
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generating electricity” will be regarded as generating electricity has led to the
situation where storage is treated as a generation asset.381 The categorization as
generation asset means that the current definition fails to acknowledge the
particularities of storage technologies. It also means that storage operators
currently need to hold a generation license to operate unless an exemption
applies (e.g. a “small generator” exemption). A separate asset class for storage
would provide greater flexibility on who can own, operate and use storage, and
the government appears open to the idea.382 Ofgem also appears to have the view
that storage should be defined as a distinct form of generation, as well as that
new licensing arrangements should be introduced—these and other
developments are awaited eagerly.383 The results of a consultation relating to the
regulatory regime for storage are eagerly awaited.384
Under the dominant legal framework, the energy storage operator also faces
the risk of double-charging. The Climate Change Levy (General) Regulations
2001 established a UK-wide levy on supplies of “taxable commodities,” which
include the supply of electricity (but also gas, LPG and solid fuels) to business
and public sector users. The main rates are paid by energy suppliers, with costs
passed on to the consumer. The energy storage operator may end up paying
double charges. The energy storage operator is legally classified as both an
electricity consumer and generator. This leads to double-charging, with storage
facilities charged once for the energy consumed (when charging) and then again
for the energy they supply. The end-user is then charged for consuming the
energy supplied by the storage facility. Appropriate use-of-system charges
should therefore be put in place, with charges based on the actual power
consumed. The lack of clarity around the current system poses a considerable
regulatory barrier and adds to the perceived risks for investors.385 In light of the
double-charging issue, Ofgem has consulted on amendments to energy storage
licenses; a decision on this is pending.386
Given that battery storage is still an emerging technology, the regulator must
also consider carefully how to maximize its revenue streams. Revenue channels
381
See The Electricity (Class Exemptions from the Requirement for a Licence) Order 2001, No. 3720, art.
2, ¶ 2 (d)(i) (UK).
382
THE ENERGY REVOLUTION, supra note 321, at 11.
383
Andrew Burgess, Re-thinking the Energy System, OFGEM (Jul. 31, 2017), https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/
news-blog/our-blog/re-thinking-energy-system.
384
Clarifying the Regulatory Framework for Electricity Storage: Licensing, OFGEM (Oct. 2, 2018),
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/clarifying-regulatory-framework-electricity-storagelicensing.
385
THE ENERGY REVOLUTION, supra note 321, at 10–11.
386
Clarifying the Regulatory Framework for Electricity Storage: Licensing, supra note 384.

LEAL-ARCASETALPROOFS_3.25.20

2020]

5/3/2020 12:22 PM

FINANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY

529

may include a mixture of frequency response, capacity market payments,
TRIAD revenue, and power supply payments. The challenge for the regulator
will be to facilitate the construction of projects that can take advantage of
multiple streams and demonstrate their bankability. A key issue in terms of the
bankability of projects over the next few years is likely to be the extent to which
storage applications can be readily combined with renewable energy generators
accredited under the RO and FIT schemes. Ofgem has recently released draft
guidance seeking to clarify its existing guidance on these requirements.387
Removing the regulatory barriers to the capacity market, such as the restrictions
on contract duration and projects receiving subsidies, should also be
considered.388
In light of the above it is clear that there are still marked barriers to storage.
It is encouraging however to see the regulator taking the lead in seeking
feedback on the current state of affairs. Indeed, Ofgem issued in July 2018
another new consultation on reforming access and forward-looking charging
arrangements in light of the emergence of, among other technologies, storage.389
The consultation focused on how best to maximize the benefits of grid
flexibility. Notably, it seeks input from all relevant stakeholders—from
consumers as well as electricity market players. The decision on this
consultation was published in December 2018, and a Significant Code Review
has now been launched.390
CONCLUSIONS
The UK has made considerable progress towards meeting its 2020 targets.
In 2017, the UK saw renewable energy’s share of electricity generation jump to
29%.391 With the UK now comfortably producing one quarter of its electricity
from renewables, the overall target of 15% consumption from renewables seems

387
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increasingly achievable. With regard to its energy saving target of 18% by 2020,
primary energy consumption fell by 15% and final energy consumption by 11%
in 2015, compared to 2007.392 Meanwhile, the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions
were 43% below 1990 levels in 2017.393 The UK has met both its first and second
carbon budgets, and is on track to meet its third. However, efforts must be
accelerated if the UK is to meet its subsequent carbon budgets.
The UK’s energy mix has transformed in recent years, with coal generation
now comprising a negligible amount of its energy requirements. In 2016, coal
accounted for only 2% of total production—a record low.394 Meanwhile, low
carbon energy sources (both nuclear and renewable) are featuring more
prominently. Primary electricity sources (nuclear, and wind and solar) and
bioenergy and waste accounted for 16% and 9% of total production in 2016,
respectively.395 Nevertheless, fossil fuels in the form of oil and gas continue to
be an important source of the UK’s energy supply. In 2016, oil accounted for
42% and natural gas 32% of total production.396 Yet, while nuclear is often
classified as a clean energy source, there are problems associated with
decommissioning and safety. Moreover, the new projects have proven to be
costly and will have a long development period. Crucially therefore, renewable
energy sources contributed to 29% of electricity generation in 2017.397 In 2017,
renewables’ share of the overall primary energy mix actually overtook nuclear
energy’s share, at 11.3%.398
While the UK has considerable natural resources of its own, it is now a net
importer of energy. In 2017, the UK’s net import dependency was 35.8%.399
Securing its energy supply will be crucial in the Brexit aftermath, and will
undoubtedly be one of the primary considerations when making the decision to
remain, or leave, the internal energy market. At present, Scotland is a key driver
of the UK’s energy transition: thus, if the UK wishes to jointly wean itself off
fossil fuels but rely on indigenous resources, it will find itself increasingly reliant
on Scotland. For the time being, this arrangement may be satisfactory. But if
Scotland were to become independent, as continues to be threatened, then the
UK may have to rethink its energy security strategy.
392
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The UK has a clear strategy for the transition to a low carbon economy; this
is backed by a comprehensive regulatory framework for the integration of nonsynchronous generation. But observers are troubled by the downward trend in
green investment. The withdrawal of governmental support schemes for solar at
a time of considerable market uncertainty appears to have compounded investor
uncertainty.400 Meanwhile, regulatory changes in 2015 appear to have created
an unfriendly planning environment for onshore wind development.401
Moreover, regulatory hurdles to the treatment of storage and demand response
also remain in place. The overall picture of the UK’s energy policy is therefore
one of imprecision and inconsistency; its ostensibly clear strategy is not matched
by a coherent regulatory framework.
With regard to digitalization, the UK has been one of the countries at the
forefront of the smart meter transition. Yet the program has not been without its
challenges. There are a number of novel aspects about the UK’s approach to the
roll-out, but the one that has caused perhaps the most issues for the UK has been
the decision to place the roll-out in the hands of the utility suppliers. Resistance
to smart meters also remains entrenched in the residential market. There have
been calls for the regulator to try to understand better why the acceptance rate
of smart meters is so low.402 More work on this should be done in order to
facilitate the smart grid transition.
The UK has therefore made progress towards establishing a smarter, more
secure, and more responsive electricity grid. Decarbonization is central to its
energy strategy, with renewable energy sources now taking an increasing share
of both energy production and electricity generation. Meanwhile, the UK’s
commitment to decentralization and digitalization underpins the moderate
successes of its smart meter program. Yet the UK has made its missteps. In
particular, the UK has found itself paying too much heed to the logic of the
incumbent fossil fuel industry. To give but a handful of examples, the UK has
cut solar subsidies at the same time as it has re-started its hydraulic fracking
program. It also promotes nuclear, even as the risks of decommissioning and
safety give rise to questions about nuclear energy’s clean credentials. The UK
also sustains barriers to storage and DSR technologies with respect to the
capacity market, allowing fossil fuels to dominate the subsidies. Finally, it has
put the smart metering program in the grip of the utility incumbents, exposing
400
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the program to the dictates of profit maximization rather than grid optimization.
Unfortunately, these lapses have resulted in a policy and regulatory framework
that is not entirely coherent.
Moving forward, the UK must take care to consult with all stakeholders in
terms of planning its future grid strategy. Ofgem continues to do good work in
this respect; only a small number of its publications have been referenced in this
paper, but they nonetheless give a flavor for its striking activism. In broad terms,
the smart grid transition hinges on the decarbonization, digitalization, and
democratization of the grid. Accordingly, the UK must consider how best to reorientate its position so that renewable energy forms the central plank of its
strategy in the years to come. Promoting green investment and righting the
downward trend in investment witnessed in recent years, should therefore be a
priority. The smart grid transition also represents an unprecedented opportunity
to democratize the grid. However, the promised democratization of the grid will
require the domestic consumer to be engaged in the transition. Thus, it will be
important, with respect to the smart metering program, for the social dimension
of the roll-out to be fully taken into account. The levels of apathy and
discontentment outlined in Section E will pose a significant hurdle to the
transition to locally based networks. In particular, therefore, the smart grid
transition must focus on how to best integrate the consumer into the smart grid
as an active party. To do this, it will be necessary to break with the logic of the
existing market framework, and to view the consumer as a market player in their
own right.

